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I. Introduction 
Jurisdictions have increasingly begun to restrict the sale 
of goods on the basis of the processes involved in production; 
even if these processes left no trace in the finished product. 
Products produced by environmentally harmful processes, sweat 
shops, and child labor are all seen as a distinct group for pur-
poses of taxation and regulation.
1
 
Such process and production method (PPM) measures 
are analytically distinct from more conventional product regula-
tion, which concerns itself with the physical aspects of the 
product and the dangers or disadvantages that this product may 
create for consumers or the environment in the regulating juris-
diction. PPM measures, by contrast, use regulation and taxation 
to try and prevent human, animal, or environmental harm out-
side their jurisdiction, and for this reason are sometimes labeled 
as extraterritorial measures. Whether or not this label can be 
justified,
2
 PPM measures certainly raise issues of sovereignty 
                                                 
 Laurens Ankersmit and Jessica Lawrence are graduate researchers in the department of Trans-
national Legal Studies at VU University Amsterdam. Gareth Davies is professor of EU Law at 
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1 See infra Part II.A for a longer discussion of the evolution of PPM measures. 
2 See infra Part II.A. 
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and raise questions about the extent of legitimate national inter-
ests. The structure of international trade organizations reflects 
these concerns. For example, both European Union (EU) law 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) law have derogations 
from the basic principles of free trade that may be invoked to 
protect concerns such as the environment, but the extent to 
which these concerns must be local remains ambiguous.
3
  
This paper puts forward the thesis that while the EU and 
WTO will inevitably share a number of legal tools in addressing 
the legal and policy challenges of PPM regulation, there are also 
reasons to expect an increasing divergence of approach between 
them. The WTO considers national rules which take PPM 
measures into account as threats to the international trading sys-
tem, and the WTO therefore attempts to limit these national 
rules. By contrast, for the EU, with its broader mandate and 
broader legislative powers, attempts to integrate economic and 
non-economic factors in order to fit its self-defined identity and 
mission.
4
 This contrast between a relatively hostile WTO and a 
relatively enthusiastic EU may lead to political, rhetorical, and 
ultimately legal conflicts. We attempt to chart below the land-
scape in which this may come about. 
The WTO (and previously the GATT) has touched on 
the legality of PPM measures in several cases, all of which have 
attracted considerable debate.
5
 While the suggestion so far is 
                                                 
3 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 36, Dec. 13, 2007, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 
53 [hereinafter TFEU]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; 
4 See Treaty on European Union preamble, Feb. 7, 1992, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 5 [hereinafter TEU]. 
5 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US—Shrimp] (noting in particular the 
arguments of the European Communities about the relationship between the environment and 
the international trade regime); Panel Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, (Apr. 20, 1996) (adopted May 20, 1996); Panel Report, 
United States—Taxes on Automobiles (not adopted), GATT Doc. DS31/R (Sept. 30, 1994); Pan-
el Report, United States—Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna (not adopted), GATT Doc. 
DS29/R (May 20, 1994) [hereinafter US—Tuna II]; Panel Report, United States—Measures Af-
fecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Doc. DS23/R - 39S/206 (Feb. 7, 1992); Panel Re-
port, United States—Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna (not adopted), GATT Doc. DS21/R 
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that reference to production methods to restrict imports, and 
conceivably as a basis for taxation, is not a priori excluded as a 
matter of principle, there are still many questions open as to 
what kinds of production concerns may be legitimately relied 
upon, and to what extent. Many commentators still consider that 
the extraterritorial aspect of PPM measures will, and should, 
mean that they can only be used to justify derogations in a lim-
ited number of exceptional circumstances.
6
 
By contrast, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has on 
multiple occasions accepted production-based concerns as a le-
gitimate reason to restrict imports or make tax distinctions with 
only limited acknowledgment that such measures are an analyti-
cally distinct group. These production-based concerns include 
not just global issues such as carbon dioxide emissions or spe-
cies protection, but also matters in which the interest of the re-
stricting state is less obvious. Localized pollution risks in anoth-
er Member State, for example, have been accepted as a 
legitimate reason to restrict trade; inter-state paternalism – or 
mutual concern – appears to be at least partially accepted, as is-
sues of sovereignty and jurisdiction have played little role in the 
Court’s thinking or reasoning.7  
This permissive attitude has even extended to tax law, 
allowing production methods to serve as an accepted basis for 
tax distinctions. This is true even where the consequences of the 
various production methods are entirely local: taxes on beer that 
                                                                                                        
(Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter US—Tuna I]; Panel Report, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32 - 
1S/59 (November 6, 1952) (adopted Nov. 7, 1952).  
6 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 50, 60–61 
(Roger B, Porter et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that the WTO needs to become more flexible with 
regard to process and production methods and trade retaliation); John H. Jackson, Comments on 
Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303 (2000) (arguing that 
the product/process distinction should not be too rigid); Peter van den Bossche, Nico Schrijver 
& Gerrit Faber, Unilateral Measures Addressing Non-Trade Concerns (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1021946 (arguing that non-trade concerns 
deserve more attention). 
7 Case C-277/02, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft 
Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-11987. 
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differ based on brewery size,
8
 and taxes on industrial alcohol 
that differ based on production method
9
 have both been permit-
ted. These taxes were upheld even though the regulating states 
had no identifiable direct interest, and suffered no direct conse-
quences, from the production methods employed in the other 
Member States.  
Implicit in these European tax cases is a certain degree 
of acceptance of national desires to maintain ‘fair competition.’ 
States may want to apply their production-based tax distinctions 
extraterritorially, not because foreign production methods affect 
their interests, but in order to prevent competitive advantages 
accruing to foreign producers.
10
 This “fair competition” debate 
touches on the very essence of international trade theory, in 
which mutual benefit is founded on the exploitation of different 
circumstances, rather than the elimination of difference.
11
 The 
extent to which such regulatory and jurisdictional competition is 
politically acceptable or desirable is a debate ongoing in all fed-
eral or international trade contexts,
12
 but has been particularly 
central to EU policy throughout its history.
13
 
                                                 
8 Case 127/75, Bobie Getränkevertrieb GmbH v Hauptzollamt Aachen-Nord, 1976 E.C.R. 1079.  
9 Case 140/79, Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v DAF SpA, 1981 E.C.R. 1. 
10 E.g., Rob Van der Laan & Andries Nentjes, Competitive Distortions in EU Environmental 
Legislation: Inefficiency Versus Inequity, 11 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 131 (2001); Robert Howse & 
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade/Free Trade Debate: Trade, Labor and the Environment, 
16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61, 74–76 (1996). 
11 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (1776); DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION (1817), for background on the theories of free trade and comparative advantage. 
12 See e.g., DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections 
on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 913–20 
(1982); Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 
1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29 (1995); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Ju-
risdiction, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 331–48 (2000).  
13 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, in REGULATORY 
COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 30 (Daniel C. Esty 
& Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Horst Siebert, The Harmonisation Process in Europe: Prior 
Agreement or a Competitive Process?, in THE COMPLETION OF THE INTERNAL MARKET (Horst 
Siebert ed., 1990); David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate 
Law Rules: An American Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communi-
ties, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 423 (1991); Patrick B. Griffin, The Delaware Effect: Keeping the 
Tiger in its Cage. The European Experience of Mutual Recognition in Financial Services, 7 
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It is tempting to further explain the EU sympathy for 
production-based measures in terms of identity, mission, and 
values. The EU certainly has a self-image and political sensitivi-
ty in which markets and trade are consciously placed in broader 
context and integrated with other policies and concerns. This 
image is profoundly rooted in domestic political and social cul-
ture: in the corporate, consensus-based social market models of 
Northern Europe, mutual interference and policy interconnect-
edness are seen as inevitable parts of the collective greater 
good.
14
 Trade as an isolated policy field is unsurprisingly alien 
to the EU Treaties, law, and way of thinking.
15
  
Rejecting the legitimacy of concern about foreign pro-
duction processes would therefore leave the EU with a trade 
policy no longer rooted in domestic political preferences, and 
ideologically rudderless. We suggest in this paper, however, 
that there are also more concrete and pragmatic reasons for the 
EU’s apparent embrace of PPM measures—something which is 
also reflected in Commission policy papers and standpoints.
16
 
The EU has both an institutional and political self-interest in the 
acceptance of extraterritorial production concerns as legitimate 
reasons to regulate and tax.
17
  
                                                                                                        
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 337 (2001); Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A 
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 405, 417–18 
(1999); Norbert Reich, Competition Between Legal Orders: A New Paradigm of EC Law?, 29 
COMMON MKT L. REV. 861 (1992); Jeanne-Mey Sun & Jacques Pelkmans, Regulatory Competi-
tion in the Single Market, 33 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 67 (1995); Henri I.T. Tijong, Breaking the 
Spell of Regulatory Competition: Reframing the Problem of Regulatory Exit (2000), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=267744.  
14 Commission Proposals for Improving Our Work, Business and Exchanges with One Another, 
at 3–5, COM (2010) 608 final (Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Proposals]; Nils Gold-
schmidt & Michael Wohlgemuth, Social Market Economy: Origins, Meanings and Interpreta-
tions, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 261 (2008).  
15 See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 
1950–57 (1958); Stephen Weatherhill, Competence and Legitimacy, in THE OUTER LIMITS OF 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 17, 19–20 (Catherine Barnard & Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2009); Eloi 
Laurent & Jacques Le Cacheux, The EU as a Global Ecological Power: The Logics of Market 
Integration, available at http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/ WP2010-08.pd; infra Part 
III.3; Commission Proposals, supra note 14.  
16 See infra Part III.B.  
17 See infra Part III.  
2012] DIVERGING EU AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 19 
 
Internally to the EU, national trade restrictions have al-
ways served a useful purpose. The restrictions help identify are-
as where EU harmonization is necessary, and trigger the harmo-
nization process, effectively expanding the reach of EU law. 
The primary effect of the famous Cassis de Dijon judgment was 
to justify a major project of European market regulation that 
continues to this day.
18
 Even instances where judgments on 
trade restrictions do not provoke the Commission to immediate 
regulation, the judgments place certain issues on the inter-state 
agenda, and inform states of others’ regulatory perspectives. 
ECJ adjudication can be seen as a form of mediated peer-review 
or inter-state dialogue, identifying the tensions that the market 
creates and the possible responses from the national and EU 
level, therefore encouraging natural regulatory convergence – 
which in turn often paves the way for EU regulation of the 
field.
19
 Each regulatory expression of a national value can be 
seen as a first step towards another brick in the house of integra-
tion, serving both the expressed goals of the Treaty and the in-
stitutional self-interest of the Commission and Parliament, and 
more arguably of the Council. 
Process-based measures fit this pattern, but in a particu-
larly powerful form. PPM-based restrictions translate domestic 
concerns into international ones, and the apparently internal be-
havior of a state becomes every other state’s business. The ac-
ceptance of the legitimacy of such measures is essentially an ac-
ceptance of the idea of community, of Union. The pooling of 
sovereignty inherent in the EU law doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect entails a pooling of values and interests.
20
 PPM 
                                                 
18 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
19 See Gareth Davies, Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonization? Lessons on 
Trade and Tolerance of Diversity from the EU, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE 
WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 265 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Alex Stone Sweet and 
Wayne Sandholtz, European Integration and Supranational Governance, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y. 
297 (1997). 
20 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL 1964 ECR 585; Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en 
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 
E.C.R. 1.  
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measures can be seen as a test of what the EU is, and as such the 
EU must accept their possibility – for the same reasons perhaps 
that the WTO must see PPM measures as alien and, in general, 
unacceptable. 
External trade and policy present a slightly different pic-
ture. The EU, as a major exporter and importer, has a commit-
ment to and an interest in international free trade. The EU has, 
however, also made an apparent commitment to the idea of soft 
power or normative power,
21
 and to the extension of its political 
influence via the export of norms, such as making economic en-
gagement conditional on non-economic norms.
22
 This self-
assumed role in defining the socio-economic Leitkultur
23
 is 
open to numerous criticisms and doubts. The robustness of the 
commitment may be doubted, with EU rhetoric often masking 
diverse perspectives within the organization and its Members. 
Furthermore, the role may be an attempt to compensate for Eu-
rope’s otherwise political and military weakness.24 In addition, 
there are forceful normative critiques to be made of the quasi-
colonial arrogance which can be attributed to such a role.
25
  
Exerting influence and leveraging domestic change 
through integration of trade and non-economic norms, however, 
is a conscious EU policy choice, and there are few contexts 
which so perfectly match this as PPMs, with their unabashedly 
universalist character.
26
 In international trade, therefore, inter-
ference in trade flows has to be balanced against the structural 
or longer-term opportunities that such interferences create. The-
                                                 
21 See infra Part III.  
22 See, e.g., Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? 40 J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD. 235, 252 (2002); Laurent & Le Cacheux, supra note 15. 
23 See generally BASSAM TIBI, EUROPA OHNE IDENTITÄT, DIE KRISE DER MULTIKULTURELLEN 
GESELLSCHAFT (1998). 
24 See Manners, supra note 22. 
25 See infra Part II.A. 
26 See TEU, supra note 4, art. 21; TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 191(1), 205, 207. Together these 
articles emphasize that the EU’s actions on the ‘international scene,’ including its external eco-
nomic policies, are to be guided by its broader social, constitutional and environmental princi-
ples and policies. 
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se interferences may establish a dynamic or a process which, as 
is internally the case, helps create multilateral consensus. The 
EU, despite being often the great power most rhetorically com-
mitted to multilateralism, paradoxically, has many reasons to be 
sympathetic to unilateralism as an agenda-forcing approach.
27
 
Common action and stable convergence require that parties ini-
tially articulate their individual values and standpoints, and once 
again, PPMs are a particularly outspoken way of doing this. The 
fundamental question facing the EU when a PPM measure ob-
structs world trade is simply whether it reflects values which 
suit the EU. The sovereignty issue as such should be of margin-
al concern to an organization fundamentally committed to erod-
ing sovereignty through transnational law. From this perspec-
tive, the threat of PPM measures to the WTO system may be 
rephrased as an opportunity to embed the WTO more profound-
ly in wider international law norms.
28
 
This paper has three broad parts. Part II outlines the pol-
icy challenges and importance of PPM regulation, particularly 
in the light of climate change. It looks at PPM measures through 
three lenses, reflecting central aspects of process-based regula-
tion: extraterritoriality, unilateralism, and the integration of 
economic and non-economic concerns. Part III considers the 
capacity of the WTO and EU to meet this challenge and their 
range of possible responses. The emphasis here is on the EU, 
where PPMs are a far less explored issue in scholarship, but 
where there is a surprising amount of implicitly or explicitly 
relevant law. It looks at existing EU law and policy, particularly 
cases of the ECJ, and the extent to which these reflect a distinc-
tive stance on PPM measures and their consequences. Finally, 
Part IV concludes. 
                                                 
27 See infra Part III.  
28 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO. How Far Can We 
Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535 (1995). 
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II. The Challenge of PPM Measures 
PPM measures present several important challenges with 
respect to the international and European trading systems. First, 
there is a constitutional challenge: PPM measures attach a price 
to noncompliance with another state’s norms. Where one state is 
powerful or important for trade, PPMs can be experienced as 
coercive by other states, and therefore can be viewed as an at-
tack on their sovereignty. The place and meaning of sovereignty 
in a densely regulated international system is the issue here. Se-
cond, PPM measures are unilateral. By exporting their own 
norms, rather than waiting for multilateral agreement, states can 
be accused of subverting, preempting or abandoning interna-
tional regulatory efforts. The extent to which unilateralism may 
be a complement or an alternative to multilateralism is the issue 
here. An invariably present suspicion that unilateral regulation 
is motivated by protectionism as much as by its stated concerns 
complicates the issue. Third, by their nature PPMs bring togeth-
er trade and non–trade concerns. This raises questions regarding 
the extent to which the trade system can and should integrate is-
sues such as environmental protection into its regulatory struc-
ture. Joined–up–policy is a cliché of good governance in many 
domestic jurisdictions, but a systemic challenge in the more 
fragmented international context.  
A. Extraterritoriality 
Traditional product-oriented trade measures protect con-
cerns proper to the regulating jurisdiction. For example, a coun-
try may restrict, tax, or prohibit the import of a product that may 
harm the health of domestic consumers. By contrast, PPM 
measures attempt to address concerns located outside of the ter-
ritory of the regulating state. For instance, a country may wish 
to restrict imports of a product because the production harms the 
health of the workers who created it.
29
 Indeed, economic 
                                                 
29 Of course, a country may also wish to restrict imports from countries with less stringent regu-
lations in order to protect domestic industries facing higher production costs as a result of higher 
2012] DIVERGING EU AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 23 
 
measures—such as differential taxation and import re-
strictions—are an important mechanism for influencing the be-
havior of actors in foreign states. It is not possible, for example, 
for a state to directly regulate emissions of greenhouse gases 
from a factory located in a foreign jurisdiction. However, re-
stricting the import of products from factories with high emis-
sion rates can create a powerful incentive to use cleaner produc-
tion methods. Economic measures based on PPMs are therefore 
an attractive option for regulators seeking to influence behavior 
in other jurisdictions. 
‘Extraterritoriality’ is a controversial concept, particular-
ly with respect to PPMs. Extraterritorial rules attempt to regu-
late persons, property or acts occurring outside the jurisdiction 
of the regulating state. Traditionally, a state’s prescriptive juris-
diction was limited to persons, property, and acts within its ter-
ritory.
30
 As the Permanent Court of International Justice wrote 
in the Lotus case, “the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a 
permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in 
any form in the territory of another State.”31 The reason for this 
was the traditional international law notion that a sovereign 
state enjoys exclusive control within its own borders. 
It must be noted that the extent to which a state or peo-
ple was to be considered ‘sovereign’ was historically tied up 
with colonial notions of cultural, racial, and economic superiori-
ty, and often referred to little more than European states and the 
states they chose to recognize.
32
 Sovereign states were often 
                                                                                                        
labor, human rights, or environmental standards. The possibility that PPMs permit this type of 
‘disguised protectionism’ is discussed further below. See infra Part II.B. 
30 As well as some exceptional situations in which a state could regulate the conduct of its na-
tionals abroad. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th sess, May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 
2006, 516, U.N. Doc. A/61/10; GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2006) [hereinafter ILC Report 
(2006)].  
31 S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7, 1927). 
32 For a detailed discussion of the way that international law was historically applied outside of 
Europe, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 98–178 (2001). See also Antony Anghie, Finding the 
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more than willing to intervene in the affairs of more ‘primitive’ 
and ‘barbaric’ regimes in support of their own commercial or 
geopolitical interests, or in order to ‘protect’ (read: civilize) the 
native peoples.
33
 The legacy of colonialism has made many 
states particularly concerned about extraterritorial action, par-
ticularly action designed to influence states’ internal policy 
choices. 
In recent years, however, the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction among sovereign states (which now includes na-
tions on all continents) has become increasingly common. In-
ternational law has even come to recognize a number of bases 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction where there is sufficient connec-
tion to the persons, property, or acts to be regulated.
34
 In com-
mercial law, in particular fields such as antitrust/competition 
law, extraterritorial rights to regulate have been accepted where 
an act occurring outside of national borders can be said to have 
substantial domestic effects.
35
  
PPM measures occupy a middle ground. Because PPMs 
incentivize, but do not mandate, certain behavior in other states, 
it is not clear to what extent these types of measures should be 
considered truly ‘extraterritorial.’ PPM measures are indeed 
concerned with behavior that occurs entirely in other jurisdic-
tions. PPM-based trade restrictions influence the behavior of ex-
tra-jurisdictional actors by providing economic incentives for 
compliance. These ‘incentives’ can skirt very close to coercion 
where the regulating state or trade bloc is a large and powerful 
economic force. The effect of such coercion is to reinstate inter-
national hierarchies that may ignore the needs of the coerced, 
and undermine the idea of global equality. Homi Bhabha pithily 
summarized the issue: “When global government is conducted 
in terms of coercive conditionality, it is difficult to enter into 
                                                                                                        
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 6 (1999) (“[S]overeignty was constituted and shaped through colonialism.”). 
33 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 32, at 98–178.  
34 See ILC Report (2006), supra note 30, at 521 (listing bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
35 See id. at 526–28. 
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equitable negotiations with one’s allies or one’s enemies.”36 In-
deed, the use of economic coercion has been condemned by the 
UN General Assembly, which, at the primary behest of the de-
veloping states, declared in 1965 that: “No State may use or en-
courage the use of economic, political or any other type of 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the 
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.”37 
Even at their most coercive, however, PPM-based 
measures do not restrain extra-jurisdictional behavior as such. 
No enforcement takes place outside the borders of the regulat-
ing state. Producers are still free to produce their goods in any 
way permitted under territorial laws.
38
 The consequence of non-
compliance with a PPM-based regulation is merely that the pro-
ducer may lose access to certain international markets.
39
 The 
coercive effect may be large where the regulating state domi-
nates an import market, but where the regulating state makes up 
only a small portion of the market a producer may chose to ig-
nore the rule largely without consequence. Thus, PPMs have 
                                                 
36 HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE, at xvi (1994). 
37 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the 
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131(XX) ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 20th 
Sess., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 11 (Dec. 21, 1965). Accord Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 32, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 
31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 50 (Dec. 12, 1974); Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/8082, at 121 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
38 One could argue that this is the consequence of a state’s lack of jurisdiction to enforce, but the 
foregoing consideration whether a state has prescriptive jurisdiction could still be answered in 
the negative. Under this view, a PPM measure would prescribe or proscribe conduct abroad, but 
only be enforced when products stemming from restricted conduct are imported into the regulat-
ing country. 
39 See, JASON POTTS, THE LEGALITY OF PPMS UNDER THE GATT 5–6 (2008), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/ppms_gatt.pdf (“[I]t is unclear how a PPM measure (or any other 
measure implemented through a government’s legitimate authority) can be said to ‘infringe’ 
upon the national sovereignty of its trading partners. If the implementation of PPM-based policy 
restricts access to a particular market, then it remains within the authority of the foreign jurisdic-
tion to decide whether or not it wants to access that market. Policies that restrict market access 
are viable instruments under international law precisely because they don’t infringe upon na-
tional sovereignty.”). 
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only indirect extraterritorial effects, proportionate to the relative 
size and importance of the importing economy.
40
 
In this sense, a PPM measure is no different than a prod-
uct requirement regulating the physical characteristics of goods. 
The presence of toxins or other undesirable physical qualities 
are also the result of production processes, so these rules also 
seek to regulate behavior in the producing jurisdiction. A pro-
ducer is only forced to comply with the safety, size, or other 
product standards an importing state sets if the producer wants 
to export products to that state.  
Moreover, the ‘extraterritoriality’ of a particular PPM 
measure is, to some extent, in the eye of the beholder. It can of-
ten be argued that the behavior being addressed in fact has a 
domestic effect. To begin with, some PPM measures are con-
cerned with behavior within another jurisdiction that affects 
global interests: for example, a measure aimed at addressing 
climate effects or carbon dioxide emissions. In such a case, the 
regulating state can claim to be acting in the interests of all. But 
more specifically, it can claim to be acting in its own interest, 
and the interests of its citizens. Because the effects of issues like 
climate change are global in scope, the consequences will also 
have effects within the jurisdiction of the regulating state. This 
can be compared with the traditional regulation of products that 
have harmful effects on persons or things within the territory of 
the importing state. These are of course legitimate matters for a 
state to be concerned about. The fact that the source of harm is 
outside the jurisdiction does not make the concern any less le-
gitimate. Indeed, this type of extraterritorial action producing 
domestic harm comes close to the doctrine of effects jurisdic-
tion under international law,
41
 in which case objections should 
                                                 
40 See ERICH VRANES, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, WTO LAW, AND LEGAL THEORY 166 (John H. Jackson ed., 2009).  
41 “[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct outside its territory that 
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987). 
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focus on the nature, scientific basis, and proportionality of the 
measure taken.
42
 
Other PPM measures are concerned with some harm 
which is physically confined to the producing jurisdiction, but 
where a strong case can be made that outside states have an in-
terest in preventing that harm. Reductions in forests and biodi-
versity could be seen as examples. It is not unreasonable to 
claim that the maintenance of global biodiversity—and for-
ests—is in the interest of all mankind, even if a species is con-
fined to a certain area. Once again, such measures can be pre-
sented as self–interested and therefore legitimate.  
This group of legitimate concerns can be greatly extend-
ed if one accepts that people have moral and ethical concern for 
the wellbeing of other individuals, animals, and the environ-
ment. Then measures aimed at preventing abuse of labor or an-
imal cruelty can be seen as preventing domestic consumers 
from implication in wrongful behavior. A regulating state which 
prevents the import of sweatshop products or factory–farm meat 
may claim to be doing what is necessary to protect the moral in-
terests of its citizens and consumers, and enforcing those inter-
ests within its sovereign territory. 
If this seems far-fetched, it may be noted that the alter-
native is to make a distinction between protecting legitimate 
physical interests (health) and legitimate economic interests 
(quality regulation), but not illegitimate moral interests. That 
distinction is hard to maintain: all states lay down laws reflect-
ing collective moral preferences, and from a welfare perspective 
regulating to prevent moral harm is not different from regulat-
ing to prevent other harms. If consumers authentically consider 
the presence of exploitative goods in shops to be harmful to 
their—perhaps collective—wellbeing, just as the presence of 
toxic or defective goods would be, then it would be arbitrary to 
preclude the necessary protective measures because of the non-
                                                 
42 See, e.g., id. § 403 (describing the limits of ‘reasonable’ extraterritorial effects jurisdiction). 
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physical nature of the harm. If there is broad democratic support 
for PPM measures concerned with labor, social, environmental, 
and animal rights based on ethical perceptions, they are argua-
bly analytically no different from consumer protection rules 
based on physical harm. 
Indeed, a given measure can invariably be recast as 
‘outwardly-directed’ or ‘inwardly-directed,’ depending on the 
interests emphasized. For example, a measure prohibiting the 
import of shoes produced through child labor could be charac-
terized as ‘outwardly-directed’ or ‘extraterritorial’ by declaring 
that its primary aim is the protection of children in foreign 
states. Alternatively, such a measure can be characterized as 
‘inwardly-directed,’ and a proper exercise of sovereign jurisdic-
tion, by presenting the regulation as aimed at protecting domes-
tic consumers from the moral taint of purchasing the products of 
child labor.
43
 Every assertion of jurisdiction can be countered 
with an assertion of extraterritoriality, and vice versa. 
Of course, some assertions of extraterritoriality or of in-
ternal moral protection are more easily defended than others. 
For instance, it may be difficult to cast Israel’s restrictions 
against the import of non-Kosher food as extraterritorial 
measures seeking to coerce producers in other states to use Ko-
sher production methods.
44
 On the other hand, it may be uncon-
vincing to claim that the moral welfare of end consumers is at 
                                                 
43 See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689, 695 
(1998) (characterizing these type of measures as “outwardly-directed,” but recognizing the arbi-
trariness of this determination). See also Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 
36 J. OF WORLD TRADE 353, 356 (2002) (noting that the argument for allowing WTO Members 
to ban the import of products that violate human rights during their production in an effort to 
protect “public morals” is among the least controversial PPM-related proposals at the WTO); 
Nicolas F. Diebold, The Morals and Order Exceptions in WTO Law: Balancing the Toothless 
Tiger and the Undermining Mole, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 43, 69 (2007) (arguing that the public 
morals exception could be used to justify an animal welfare measure on moral grounds and thus 
bypass the issue of extraterritoriality). 
44 See WTO Secretatiat, Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Israel, Sec. III ¶¶ 27, 
48, WT/TPR/S/157 (Mar. 24, 2006) (“[S]ince December 1994, Israel has maintained a ban on 
imports of non-kosher meat and meat products. However, the Government permits limited do-
mestic production, sale, and consumption of non-kosher meat.”). 
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risk if the producing state merely has more relaxed regulation 
on pollution, social rights, labor rights, or land usage than in the 
importing state, and consumers in the importing state seem in-
different to their economic support for these standards. In such 
contexts the suspicion of economic motives is raised, something 
discussed more in the following section. 
Since PPM measures generally restrict trade, the deroga-
tions permitted by the appropriate regulatory system are the lo-
cus for adjudication on the limits of the kind and extent of self-
interest which is to be acknowledged, and the weight to be ac-
corded to freedom from de facto coercion. As will be explored 
below, the EU, both internally and externally, has taken a more 
liberal approach than the WTO with respect to the extent of 
permissible extraterritorial action to protect what it considers to 
be important values.
45
 
B. Unilateralism 
Process-based regulations are not necessarily unilat-
eral—indeed, a number of multilateral environmental agree-
ments contain such measures.
46
 However, the unilateralism of 
the process-based measures that have been challenged before 
the WTO and ECJ has proven one of their more objectionable 
aspects. While closely linked to the issue of extraterritoriality, 
unilateralism provides a distinct lens, less constitutionalist and 
more systemic, through which to look at PPM regulation and to 
                                                 
45 See infra Part III.1.B. 
46 See, e.g., Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, 
Nov. 24, 1989, 1899 U.N.T.S 3 (prohibiting the use of long driftnets in the South Pacific); Con-
vention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20, 1980, 1329 
U.N.T.S. 47 (setting limits on the harvest of krill and crab); Basel Convention on the Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 
57 (taking an ‘integrated life-cycle’ approach to waste management and prohibiting the export 
of waste to countries with inadequate environmental rules); Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S 3 (obliging parties to ban the im-
port of ozone-depleting substances, and to consider a ban on the import of products that use the 
controlled substances in their production practices). 
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highlight certain specific policy problems.
47
 First among these 
is that a country’s motives may be more likely to be seen as 
suspect where the country acts unilaterally. Second, unilateral 
action means that the regulator is attempting to set international 
standards without the agreement of other sovereign states, rais-
ing questions as to the legitimacy of those standards and the 
consequences for multilateral efforts. 
To begin with, unilateral PPMs are seen as suspicious 
because they can easily be used as covert instruments of protec-
tionism.
48
 A government that regulates production methods may 
do so not in order to protect a ‘legitimate interest,’ but instead to 
‘level the playing field’ or to impose an additional burden on 
foreign producers to keep them from gaining a competitive ad-
vantage over their domestic counterparts.
49
 For example, a gov-
ernment that requires its own producers to use expensive ‘dol-
phin-safe nets’ may worry that this will give foreign ‘dolphin-
unsafe’ producers a cost advantage, and regulate imports ac-
cordingly. For this reason, some commentators have argued that 
unilateral PPMs pose a particular danger to the international 
trading system.
50
 The legitimacy of international trade agree-
ments comes partly from the classical economic perspective that 
trade is beneficial precisely because different jurisdictions have 
different advantages, whether these be natural, social, or legal 
                                                 
47 See, Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism’, Values, and International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291, 
293 (2000); Bernhard Jansen, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective, 11 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 309, 310 (2000). 
48 See e.g., Candice Stevens, Syntheses Repot: Trade and Environment: PPM Issues, in TRADE 
AND ENVIRONMENT: PROCESS AND PRODUCTION METHODS 7, 19 (1994) (“[T]he use of PPM-
based trade restrictions could serve all types of protectionist aims as countries seek to maximize 
the competitiveness of domestic industries.”). 
49 Robert Hudec, for example, provides the following compelling example of how finely-drawn 
tariff classifications can be used for protectionist purposes: “Everyone has heard the story of the 
1904 German tariff concession to Switzerland lowering the tariff on ‘Large dapple[d] mountain 
cattle reared at a spot at least 300 meters above sea level and having at least one month’s graz-
ing each year at a spot at least 800 meters above sea level.’ . . . Ultra-fine tariff distinctions were 
a well established tradition among the trade negotiators who, forty-three years later, wrote the 
GATT.” Robert E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and 
III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE 
LAW 101, 109–10 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000). 
50 See e.g.,Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The 
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 291 (1997). 
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advantages. Specialization and exchange is therefore mutually 
beneficial. However, if differences between jurisdictions are 
seen as obstacles to trade, and states attempt to compensate for 
them by national regulation, the fundamental economic ad-
vantage of trade is gone. PPM measures can be precisely at-
tempts to do this—equalizing national conditions to protect do-
mestic producers. As a result, some commentators continue to 
advocate a tough anti-PPM position. As Thomas Schoenbaum 
wrote, “It may be objected that this policy invalidates many 
‘good’ PPM regulations that protect dolphins and other aspects 
of the environment, but there simply is no principled way to 
permit ‘good’ PPM regulations without opening the door to un-
acceptable abuses.”51 
In response, it might be noted that the problem of dis-
guised protectionism is no less acute with respect to product-
related measures. The long history of challenges to product-
related measures at the WTO and ECJ is a testament to this.
52
 
Nevertheless, PPM-based measures are particularly susceptible 
to protectionist manipulation because they are so directly linked 
to important, but indirect, aspects of production cost, such as la-
bor and environmental standards. 
It may be argued that this type of protectionism is not 
necessarily a bad thing. PPM-based measures are in some sense 
attempts to prevent foreign producers from reaping the benefit 
of lower human rights, labor, environmental, or other standards. 
Unilateral PPM-based measures may be intended to force for-
eign producers to internalize negative externalities—as, per-
haps, domestic producers are required to do. Protecting domes-
tic producers and protecting foreign actors in that case could be 
said to go hand in hand.  
This brings us to the second major problem posed by 
unilateralism. Unilateral actions are taken in situations where 
                                                 
51 Id. at 291. 
52 See infra Part III.1–2. 
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negotiation with other states has not taken place or failed to 
produce the desired outcome. This raises a legitimacy issue. It 
could be argued that if the interest at stake is genuine, it should 
be possible to come to a multilateral agreement to regulate. 
Where an issue affects multiple states, those states all have 
some interest in designing the rules that will govern it. Imposing 
coercive unilateral measures to regulate issues with widespread 
causes and effects denies the rights of other affected states to 
have a say in the decision-making process. In cases where states 
disagree strongly about the legitimacy of a particular measure it 
must be asked why the opinion of the unilaterally regulating 
state should prevail over all others.
53
  
Even assuming the interest protected is ‘genuine’ and 
not ‘disguised protectionism,’ the unilateral imposition of hu-
man rights, labor, animal welfare, and environmental standards 
smacks of an enforced moral ‘universalism’ that is in reality on-
ly partial.
54
 A number of commentators have pointed out the re-
lationship between this type of value export and a colonial-era 
mentality that encourages the export of ‘civilization’ to the 
‘barbaric’ world in the interest of the colonizing states.55 Where 
these notions are presented as universal it is the result of a long 
process of naturalizing the culture and society of dominant 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF 
GLOBAL RULES 95–116 (2005) (arguing against trade unilateralism); Ottavio Quirico, EU Bor-
der Tax Adjustments and Climate Change: Reaching Consensus within the International Legal 
Context, EUR. ENERGY AND ENVTL. L. REV. 230 (2010) (arguing that unilateral measures to 
address climate change are illegal without serious negotiations to try to come to bilateral or mul-
tilateral solutions). 
54 Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: the View of an Insider-Outsider, 
45 VILL. L. REV. 841, 844–51 (2000) (“[I]nternational law is, therefore, Eurocentric in that it 
issues from European thought, culture and experiences. This specificity denies international law 
universality. . . . Even the international law of human rights, arguably the most benign of all the 
areas of international law, seeks the universalization of Eurocentrism. The human rights corpus 
is driven by. . . the savage-victim-savior metaphor. . . . In this script of human rights, democracy 
and western liberalism are internationalized to save savage non-Western cultures from them-
selves and to ‘alleviate’ the suffering of victims, who are generally non-Western and non-
European.”). 
55 See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Mak-
ing, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 31 (2004) (“[WTO’s and EU’s externally projected interests] manifest 
the vision of the [transnational capitalist class] and inform the nascent imperial global state.”). 
2012] DIVERGING EU AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 33 
 
groups.
56
 The idea of unilateralism is tied up with “a strong no-
tion of leadership, based on material hegemony and, most often, 
on the idea of a global mission of the dominant power to keep 
peace, order, and civilization and to protect ‘democratic val-
ues.”57 Where unilateralism pursues a neo-colonialist civilizing 
mission it cannot help but imply the hierarchical inferiority of 
differing traditions, and thereby deny the reality of differing de-
sires, cultures, needs, and experiences. In other words, where 
one culture deems itself superior to all others, then it follows 
that unilateral export—not multilateral dialogue—is the best 
means of pursuing global progress. 
Unilateralism, however, can also be seen in a positive 
light. First, unilateralism is sometimes the only available path 
toward regulation to protect important values. Multilateral nego-
tiations may fail for various reasons, some of them more legiti-
mate than others. Where countries balk at imposing regulations, 
as Dan Bodansky notes, “the choice is not between unilateral-
ism and multilateralism, but between unilateralism and inac-
tion.”58  
Second, viewing only PPM-based measures as unilateral 
is one-sided. Actions by a producer or producing state can also 
constitute a unilateral act. As Howse and Regan astutely point 
out, “the absence of negotiated rules or norms, leaving the coun-
try of production to make these determinations on its own, un-
constrained by stipulations imposed by its trading partners who 
are importing the product, would itself be countenancing ‘uni-
lateralism,’ in this case, the unilateral determination by the 
country of production of matters that affect the global com-
mons.”59 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 54. 
57 ÉTIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE? REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL 
CITIZENSHIP 207 (James Swenson trans., 2004). 
58 Daniel Bodansky, What’s So Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?, 11 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 339, 339 (2000). 
59 Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory Basis for Dis-
ciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 251 (2000). 
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Third, unilateralism can provide an incentive to tackle 
concerns collectively. One state’s unilateral action can some-
times act as a catalyst for multilateral negotiations, thereby lead-
ing to a global or regional solution. This has occurred a number 
of times in the context of international environmental law,
60
 as 
well as in the EU.
61
 
Of all the different ways of looking at PPM regulation, 
unilateralism may be the perspective that most clearly highlights 
the power issues involved. A jurisdiction or institution may see 
unilateralism as a threat, a precious right, or a destabilizing op-
portunity. This perspective will be influenced by the jurisdic-
tion’s or institution’s policy goals, relative power, and percep-
tions of how realistic the multilateral alternative is, as well as 
the extent to which the jurisdiction or institution is aligned with 
the likely outcomes of unilateralism.  
C. Non-Trade Concerns 
PPM measures link trade and non-trade concerns in a 
way which can be challenging for a jurisdiction with incomplete 
regulatory powers. There is much dispute over whether institu-
tions and rules designed to protect trade are the appropriate fo-
rum for action to protect social or environmental welfare. 
Many believe that trade bodies like the WTO should not 
look beyond the four corners of their own constitutive agree-
ments, and that social problems posed by international trade 
should be dealt with separately through issue-specific law and 
policy.
62
 For one, trade bodies may be unsuited to the task of 
adjudicating social issues. Trade bodies logically privilege trade 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 58, at 344 (citing historical examples of unilateral action lead-
ing to multilateral standard-setting).  
61 See infra Part III.1.B. See generally Davies, supra note 19; Sweet & Sandholtz, supra note 19 
(explaining how European Community rule-making is created and sustained through individual 
acts of European countries). 
62 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 354 (2004) (“Rather than transform itself into a global government . . . 
the WTO should stick to its limited but important role: reducing barriers to trade among na-
tions.”). 
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interests over all other concerns, an institutional bias that would 
work to the detriment of important non-trade values.
63
 Further-
more, trade bodies are not expected to have expertise in areas 
such as human rights, environmental protection, or animal wel-
fare, making it both unrealistic and unfair to expect trade bodies 
to make appropriate decisions regarding these issues.
64
  
These expectations become even more unrealistic when 
cultural specificity is considered along with fact-dependency. 
Interpreting the legality of trade restrictions on the basis of 
‘public morals’ is a dangerous and slippery slope for any trans-
national adjudicator, and particularly for trade regimes. Interfer-
ing in culturally sensitive areas such as public morality, labor 
law, or animal welfare is a delicate business, and runs the risk 
that decisions may begin to be seen as unacceptably ‘politi-
cal.’65 International economic law has invested heavily in pre-
senting its regulations as ‘neutral,’ ‘scientific’ deductions from 
economic or objective principles.
66
 Examining social issues in 
                                                 
63 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky & Jessica C. Lawrence, Trade and Environment, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 505, 533 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) 
(“[M]any still argue that the WTO dispute settlement system is tilted toward the trade perspec-
tive (after all, it can strike down an environmental measure as inconsistent with [trade rules], but 
not vice versa).”). 
64 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Environment 
Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1043, 1128 (1994) (“[Trade institutions] are incapable of provid-
ing a balanced response to the competing interests at stake.”). 
65 See Geert van Calster, The EU, Trade, Environment, and Unilateralism: Passing the Buck, 5 
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 9, 14 (2000) (explaining that the definition of “public morals” differs 
in many countries); Diebold, supra note 43, at 43–60. 
66 See, e.g., Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at 
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329, 2333–38 (2000) (describing the techno-
cratic style of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”), and 
its goal to utilize science in rule-making regarding trade); Robert Howse, The Boundaries of the 
WTO: From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading 
Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 98 (2002) (“A sense of pride developed [with GATT trade policy 
managers] that an international regime was being evolved that stood above the ‘madhouse’ of 
politics . . ., a regime grounded in the insights of economic ‘science,’ and not vulnerable to the 
open-ended normative controversies and conflicts that plagued most international institutions 
and regimes.”). Cf. Joseph Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections 
on WTO Dispute Settlement, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 334, 336–37 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (ex-
plaining how GATT formed a self-referential network that sought to keep economic disputes 
separate from the rest of international politics). 
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this context threatens to muddy the waters, bringing unscien-
tific, cultural concerns back into the mix.
67
  
In addition, regulating these issues at a transnational 
level is often seen as interfering unacceptably with domestic 
politics. Social concerns such as labor and environmental stand-
ards—in particular, those that do not affect the global com-
mons—are seen as fundamentally a matter of domestic policy, 
to be decided as close to the level of the citizen as possible.
68
 
On the other hand, many have countered that economic 
and non-economic interests are often both reflected in a given 
problem, and are difficult—if not impossible—to disentangle. 
As a result, they argue that it is necessary to address trade and 
non-trade concerns together.
69
 Regulations like climate- or hu-
man rights-protecting PPM measures therefore challenge the 
ideational basis of international trade law. They assert that trade 
cannot be considered aside from other issues, and that every act 
of production and trade must also be assessed from non-
economic perspectives. If this becomes the general rule, then 
the future of a trade-specific body may be grim.  
In addition, institutions designed to promote and manage 
trade are widely viewed as among the most effective suprana-
tional regulatory bodies, which makes them an attractive forum 
for social activism. Why build an entirely new environmental or 
human rights machinery when these issues could be inserted in-
to an already well-developed framework? 
The scope and extent of production issues attracting reg-
ulatory concern is increasing quickly, making the above more 
than an exercise in legal nicety. A growing number of states 
would like to tax or regulate in ways that would aid in protect-
                                                 
 
68 This concept is the basis for the EU idea of subsidiarity, and the US ideal of federalism. 
69 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 
307 (2004) (“[R]ather than slowing progress in the trade area, non-trade concerns should be ad-
dressed by increasing the level of international cooperation and promoting agreements that take 
both trade and non-trade issues into account.”). 
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ing forests and biodiversity; the goal of integrating the climatic 
effects of goods into tax rules and product law has arrived, and 
poses a systemic and open-ended threat to deregulated interna-
tional trade.
70
 For example, the production of almost all goods 
involves the use of energy. Taxation or regulation based on the 
emission of carbon dioxide during production would potentially 
apply to all goods, creating a trade restriction of wide and 
unique breadth. Additionally, there would be vast bureaucracy 
involved in establishing and proving the amount of energy in-
volved, whether it is from fossil sources or renewable ones, and 
whether any compensation has taken place, (and what kinds of 
compensation are acceptable or effective). Systematic attempts 
to take account of the climatic effects of production and trade 
would create a volume of regulation and litigation that would 
likely be greater than the rest of existing trade law.  
III. The WTO and EU Responses 
In the context of the WTO, the proper place to address 
PPM concerns is through the derogation clauses, where PPMs 
should be strictly policed and subject to critical examination for 
their proportionality.
71
 Each piece of PPM legislation is a re-
striction on trade, and the unfettered growth of PPM regulations 
can only be experienced by the WTO system as a threat. As 
Joost Pauwelyn notes, “the GATT/WTO’s operating system or 
magic trick is grounded in a deep mistrust of domestic politics, 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Commission Regulation 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 October 2010 Laying Down the Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber 
Products on the Market, 2010 O.J. (L 295) 23. Additionally, there are multiple initiatives by EU 
Member States with regard to the public procurement of sustainable timber, as demonstrated by 
the following websites: INKOOP DUURZAAM HOUT [SUSTAINABLY PRODUCED TIMBER], 
www.inkoopduurzaamhout.nl (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); NATURSTYRELSEN [DANISH NATURE 
AGENCY], www.skovognatur.dk (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); THE CENTRAL POINT OF EXPERTISE 
FOR TIMBER PROCUREMENT (www.cpet.org.uk) (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). See also Gavin Goh, 
The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 38 J. WORLD 
TRADE 395 (2004); Jochem Wiers, French Ideas on Climate and Trade Policies, 2 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 18 (2008). 
71 See GATT, supra note 3, art. XX. Cf. Sanford E. Gaines, Processes and Production Methods: 
How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?, 27 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 383, 388 (2002) (“[W]e must move away from the clean escape of the revisionist 
analysis of the GATT and toward the more arduous terrain of policy negotiation and incremental 
adjustment of Article XX interpretation.”). 
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the assumption being that if we leave national parliaments 
alone, protectionism will be rampant.”72 Some concessions must 
be made, because the concerns involved are too politically sig-
nificant to be brushed aside, but these concessions are likely to 
be miserly and nervous: if export of environmental and social 
norms becomes the rule, then the international trading system 
will at the least require a redesign. For these reasons, several 
WTO Member States have challenged the ‘extraterritorial’ and 
‘unilateral’ aspects of PPMs, and have resisted the integration of 
non-trade concerns into the realm of international trade law.
73
 
In contrast, it is likely that the EU will see PPM 
measures as an opportunity. While Member State measures 
have the same kind of internal trade-restricting effects, the range 
of possible EU responses is wider than those open to the WTO, 
and some of these responses fit with the EU’s self-declared 
identity and mission. For instance, the EU has embraced the in-
tegration of trade and non-trade concerns, both in its governing 
documents and in its internal and external practices.
74
  
Moreover, in the few PPM-related cases it has adjudi-
cated thus far, the ECJ has not treated PPM measures by EU 
Member States substantially different than it treats other trade 
restrictions.
75
 The Court has held that processing require-
                                                 
72 Joost Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 559, 560 
(2008). 
73 See supra note 5. 
74 See, e.g., TEU, supra note 4, art. 21; TFEU, supra note 3, arts. 191, 205–07. 
75 ECJ’s case law on the free movement of goods—protected by TFEU arts. 34–36—is very 
broad in scope and covers all quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect, which 
extend to “all trading rules enacted by member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade.” Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Das-
sonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. A wide range of regulatory measures are encompassed in this case 
law, including those that apply indiscriminately to foreign and domestic goods alike. One of the 
major characteristics of the Court’s approach to the free movement of goods is the principle of 
mutual recognition or functional equivalence established in Cassis de Dijon. Case 120/78, 
Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 
649. Under this principle, a good lawfully manufactured in one Member State should be allowed 
access to the markets of other Member States. The ECJ has limited the deregulatory potential of 
this principle by adopting a rule of reason whereby a Member State can justify a restriction by 
reference to the so-called “mandatory requirements.” The Court’s case law on the free move-
ment of goods has therefore put a lot of emphasis on the Member State’s defense of a regulatory 
measure. With a prima facie violation easily found, it is the justification of the measure and its 
2012] DIVERGING EU AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 39 
 
ments—including those based on non-trade concerns—are a re-
striction of intra-EU trade and therefore must be justified in or-
der to be compatible with the Treaty.
76
 The ECJ has accepted a 
range of justifications, as long as these justifications reflect con-
cerns acknowledged as European goals, and there has not been 
any harmonization to preempt the Member State’s action.77 In 
regard to tax measures, the Court has not recognized PPM 
measures as an analytically distinct group and has allowed 
Member States to make distinctions between products on the 
basis of production processes employed for tax purposes.
78
 
The following sections examine the EU and WTO re-
sponses to PPM measures in more detail, from the various per-
spectives discussed in the preceding sections. 
1. Extraterritoriality 
A. The WTO 
The WTO has been relatively hostile to extraterritorial 
regulation. Indeed, the intrusion by one state into the sovereign 
affairs of another goes against what John Jackson called one of 
                                                                                                        
proportionality that is the crux of the argument. The Court has interpreted these derogations 
strictly, so as not to reserve certain matters to the exclusive jurisdiction of Member States. See 
J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolu-
tion of the Free Movement of Goods, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 349 (Paul Craig & 
Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999); Jukka Snell, The Notion of Market Access: A Concept or a Slo-
gan?, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 437 (2010).  
76 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-158/04 & C-159/04, Alfa Vita Vassilopoulos AE v. Elliniko Dimo-
sio, Nomarchiaki Aftodiikisi Ioanninon, 2006 E.C.R. I-8135; Case 6/81 BV Industrie Diensten 
Groep v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R. 707; Case 153/78, Comm’n of the 
European Communities v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., 1979 E.C.R. 2555; Case C-147/04 De Groot en 
Slot Allium BV and Bejo Zaden BV v. Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 
2006 E.C.R. I-245; Case C-277/02, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Management-
Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-11987; Case C-379/98, Preussen Elektra AG 
v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-2099; Case C-1/96, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries 
and Food ex parte Compassion in World Farming Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-1281; Case C-5/94, The 
Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 
E.C.R. I-2553. 
77 See, e.g., EU-Wood-Trading GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. at I-11987 (finding that the goals pursued 
through these regulations were legitimate). But see, e.g., Comm’n of the European Communities, 
1979 E.C.R. at 2565–67 (rejecting Germany’s proffered reasons for controlling the trade of meat 
products with Member States); Preussen Elektra AG, 2001 E.C.R. at I-2156–57. 
78 See infra Part III.4. 
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the seven “mantras” of the WTO: preservation of “national or 
non-state sovereignty.”79  
The idea of extraterritoriality is in conflict with the insti-
tutional identity of the WTO in a significant way. The WTO 
considers itself to be a member-driven organization
80
 that exists 
in large part to maintain the negotiated equilibrium among its 
Member States. The primary concern of the WTO is stabilizing 
the trade system and preventing the nullification or impairment 
of trade concessions, while simultaneously working to ratchet 
down the level of remaining barriers.
81
 Thus, the WTO is not 
concerned with extraterritoriality in a formal sense, but rather 
with extraterritoriality insofar as it upsets intra-state trade rela-
tions and the compromise positions of the Member States.  
Because its concern is relational, the case-specific ap-
proach to extraterritoriality adopted by the Appellate Body in 
US—Shrimp makes a great deal of sense. In that case, the Ap-
pellate Body refused to find PPM-based regulations impermis-
sible as a class due to their extraterritorial effects:  
It is not necessary to assume that requiring from 
exporting countries compliance with, or adoption 
of, certain policies (although covered in principle 
by one or another of the exceptions) prescribed 
by the importing country, renders a measure a 
priori incapable of justification under Article 
XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if not 
all, of the specific exceptions of Article XX inu-
                                                 
79 John H. Jackson, The WTO ‘Constitution’ and Proposed Reforms: Seven ‘Mantras’ Revisited, 
4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 67, 72 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
80 Id. at 72 (“[A] mantra often used is that the [WTO] is ‘member driven.’ ”) (emphasis omitted). 
81 See Kalypso Nicoaïdis & Robert Howse, ‘This is my EUtopia . . . ’: Narrative as Power, 40 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 767, 776 (2002) ( “[T]he management of the multilateral trading system 
involved not only the negotiation of new concessions, but also the task of interpreting or evolv-
ing rules that distinguished between policy interventions  . . . thus threatening the co-operative 
equilibrium.”). 
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tile, a result abhorrent to the principles of inter-
pretation we are bound to apply.
82
 
The Appellate Body further refused to decide whether 
there were firm territorial limits to Article XX: 
We do not pass upon the question of whether 
there is an implied jurisdictional limitation in Ar-
ticle XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that 
limitation. We note only that in the specific cir-
cumstances of the case before us, there is a suffi-
cient nexus between the migratory and endan-
gered marine populations involved in the United 
States for the purposes of Article XX(g).
83
 
The Appellate body, however, expressed concern with 
the possibility that extraterritorial actions would infringe on the 
rights of other Member States: 
The task of interpreting and applying the cha-
peau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of lo-
cating and marking out a line of equilibrium be-
tween the right of a Member to invoke an 
exception under Article XX and the rights of 
other Members under varying substantive provi-
sions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so 
that neither of the competing rights will cancel 
out the other and thereby distort and nullify or 
impair the balance of rights and obligations con-
structed by the Members themselves in that 
Agreement. The location of the line of equilibri-
um, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and 
unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the 
                                                 
82 US—Shrimp, supra note 5, ¶ 121. 
83 Id. ¶ 133. 
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shape of the measures at stake vary and as the 
facts making up specific cases differ.
84
 
PPMs present a logical concern for the WTO where they 
upset this relational balance of power, infringing on the rights 
claimed by other Member States. Indeed, many of the argu-
ments against PPMs focus on the fact that they are a tool that 
can be used by powerful trading blocs to impose their values on 
other states and impair the benefits of trade liberalization. This 
worry is exacerbated by the fact that “[t]he user of the PPM is 
almost always a rich country, and the target country is often a 
developing country.”85 As the WTO Ministerial Conference 
noted in 2005, many developing countries equate the use of 
PPMs “with richer countries attempting to impose their envi-
ronmental and social standards on the rest of the world.”86 Such 
situations have led to charges of ‘neo-’ or ‘eco-imperialism,’87 
in which rich countries attempt to coerce poor countries into 
adopting regulatory regimes that may be ill-adapted or infeasi-
ble for their context.  
As a result of their extraterritoriality, therefore, PPMs 
represent a challenge to the WTO’s ideal of relational equilibri-
um. Where a conflict over regulatory jurisdiction occurs, the or-
ganization’s first loyalty is to protecting the sovereignty of all 
members and restoring the balance of negotiated concessions.  
B. The EU 
The EU has a stronger institutional identity and more au-
tonomy from its Member States, which, as the ECJ famously 
held in Van Gend & Loos, “have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields” and thereby created a new legal or-
                                                 
84 Id. ¶ 159. 
85 Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of 
Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 62 (2002). 
86 World Trade Organization, Sixth Ministerial Conference, Hong Kong Briefing Notes, 
WT/MIN(05), 35 (Dec. 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief00_e.htm. 
87 See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 62. 
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der.
88
 Notwithstanding the debates surrounding the extent of 
these limitations, fifty years of European integration and the 
transfer of competences to the EU have made the initial idea of 
limiting sovereignty somewhat less of an issue. Therefore, one 
would expect less resistance towards extraterritorial protection 
of non-trade concerns by Member States, if such protection re-
flects the position of the community and the values the Member 
States share with each other. Lifting sovereignty would also 
make such extraterritorial protection less necessary, and more 
short-term in instances where it was found to be necessary, be-
cause Member States can solve such issues through harmoniza-
tion. The consequences of these contextual factors are summa-
rized by Debra Steger: “[R]ather than worrying incessantly 
about sovereignty, [Europeans] speak about the benefits that 
come from ‘pooling’ sovereignty.”89  
The Court’s case law on extraterritorial protection of 
non-trade concerns by Member States within the free movement 
of goods seems to reflect this. The Court seems to favor the ex-
traterritorial protection of non-trade concerns if (1) these con-
cerns are part of EU policy or an EU objective and (2) there has 
been no harmonization on the subject. Where there is harmoni-
zation, or where the regulation does not serve an EU policy or 
EU objective, the Court is less inclined to accept extraterritorial 
protection. In the last two decades the ECJ seems generally to 
have adopted a pragmatic approach that is much more focused 
on the proportionality of a measure and its effects on harmoni-
zation than on any jurisdictional concern.
90
 
Early cases in the 1970s gave some signs that extraterri-
torial protection of non-trade issues would not be permitted. In 
its seminal ruling in Cassis de Dijon, the Court stated that "[i]n 
the absence of common rules . . . it is for the Member States to 
                                                 
88 Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport—en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. 
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2.  
89 Debra P. Steger, The Culture of the WTO: Why It Needs to Change, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 483, 
488 (2007). 
90 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
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regulate all matters relating to the production and marketing of 
alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their own territory.”91 This 
statement could be read as indicating a presumption against 
regulating to address external harms.  
The Advocate General’s opinions in Dassonville and 
Kramer seem to support this stance. In Dassonville, the Court 
had to assess whether a Belgian law requiring imports of whis-
key to be accompanied with a certificate of origin was compati-
ble with the free movement of goods.
92
 While the Court did not 
address the issue of whether the protection of industrial and 
commercial property of another state was a legitimate concern, 
Advocate General Trabucchi considered the protection of extra-
territorial interests impermissible.
93
 In his opinion:  
The protection of designations of origin of prod-
ucts is covered by the principle of protection of 
industrial and commercial property for which Ar-
ticle 36 allows necessary derogations to the pro-
hibition on quantitative restrictions and measures 
having equivalent effect. However, on the basis 
of this rule, States can derogate in the said man-
ner only for the purpose of the protection of their 
own interests and not for the protection of the in-
terests of other States. Thus, for example, re-
strictions on freedom of movement, which a 
State can introduce on the basis of this rule for 
the protection of public health, cannot in any 
case justify restrictions on exports of products 
considered harmful for the purpose of protecting 
the public health of the populations of other 
Member States. Article 36 allows every State the 
right to protect exclusively its own national in-
                                                 
91 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649, 662 (emphasis added). 
92 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837. 
93 Id. at 855 (Opinion of Advocate-General Trabucchi); see also Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, 
Cornelis Kramer and others, 1974 E.C.R. 1279. 
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terests. Consequently, for the purpose of protect-
ing industrial and commercial property, each 
State can restrict the freedom of movement of 
goods only with reference to the protection of in-
dividual rights and economic interests falling un-
der its own sphere of interest.
94
  
In the 1990s, however, the Court’s opinion of extraterri-
torial action began to seem more ambiguous. In four cases re-
garding the extraterritorial protection of animal welfare, the ECJ 
made several contradictory indications regarding the permissi-
bility of protecting animals outside the territory of the regulat-
ing Member State.
95
 Two cases regarding import prohibitions to 
protect bird species seemed relatively permissive regarding ex-
traterritoriality, while two cases concerning export prohibitions 
to protect sheep and cows were fairly restrictive.
96
 In all four 
cases, however, the measures’ effect on harmonization was a 
primary concern.
97
 
The protection of wild birds is partly harmonized in the 
EU,
98
 but some Member States maintain regulations that go be-
yond the protection afforded by the directive—including regula-
tions protecting species that occur only outside the territory of 
the regulating Member State. In Gourmetterie van den Burg, for 
example, a trader challenged a Dutch law prohibiting the buying 
and selling of red grouse, a species native only to the British 
Isles and freely marketed there.
99
 The Dutch law sought to justi-
                                                 
94 Procureur du Roi, 1974 E.C.R. at 860 (Opinion of Advocate-General Trabucchi) (emphasis 
added). 
95 Compare Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 
E.C.R. I-2143, with Case C-202/94, Criminal Proceedings against Godefridus Van der Feesten, 
1996 E.C.R. I-355, with Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex 
parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-2553, with Case 153/78, Comm’n of the Eu-
ropean Communities v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., 1979 E.C.R. 2555. 
96 Compare Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. at I-2143, and Van der Feesten, 1996 E.C.R. at I-355, 
with Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. at I-2553, and Fed. Rep. of Ger., 1979 E.C.R. at 
2555. 
97 See Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. at I-2143; see also Van der Feesten, 1996 E.C.R. at I-355; 
Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. at I-2553; Fed. Rep. of Ger., 1979 E.C.R. at 2555. 
98 Council Directive 2009/147, 2010 O.J. (L 20) (EC). 
99 Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. at I-2146–47. 
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fy the measure on the grounds of protecting the life and health 
of animals.
100
 Notably, the Commission supported the permissi-
bility of the Dutch extraterritorial protective measures.
101
 The 
ECJ ultimately found against the law, not because it sought to 
protect a species that occurred outside of its jurisdiction, but be-
cause the directive provided for complete harmonization with 
regards to non-migratory species.
102
 The ECJ, however, implied 
that had the protected species been migratory or endangered, the 
regulation would have been permissible.
103
  
Similarly, Van der Feesten involved a Dutch law prohib-
iting the keeping, purchase, sale, import, and export of wild 
birds.
104
 The law was challenged on the grounds that it extended 
to birds occurring naturally in the wild only outside of the Neth-
erlands.
105
 In this case, the ECJ went further than in Van den 
Burg, upholding the law on the grounds that the protection of 
foreign birds was logically necessary to protect domestic wild 
birds that might interbreed with them.
106
 The Court found that: 
“[T]he Directive applies to bird subspecies which occur natural-
ly in the wild only outside the European territory of the Member 
States if the species to which they belong or other subspecies of 
that species occur naturally in the wild within the territory in 
question.”107 The Court thus accepted that the protection pro-
                                                 
100 See id. at I-2148. 
101 See id. at I-2155 (Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven) (“In the Commission’s view, it 
is immediately apparent from Article 36 that the aim of protecting animal life can apply equally 
well to animals which do not occur in the country adopting the protective measures as to animal 
species actually found there.”).  
102 See id. at I-2164. 
103 See id. at I-2163 (“[The Directive] grants special protection to migratory species which con-
stitute, according to the third recital in the preamble to the directive, a common heritage of the 
Community. [And] in the case of the most endangered birds, the directive provides that the spe-
cies listed in Annex I must be the subject of special conservation measures in order to ensure 
their survival and protection. It follows from those general objectives laid down by [the Di-
rective] for the protection of birds that the Member States are authorized, pursuant to Article 14 
of the directive, to introduce stricter measures to ensure that the aforesaid species are protected 
even more effectively.”). 
104 Case C-202/94, Criminal Proceedings against Godefridus Van der Feesten, 1996 E.C.R. I-
355, 382. 
105 Id. at I-357 (Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly). 
106 Id. at I-386–87. 
107 Id. at I-387. 
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vided for by EU legislation had no firm territorial limits, but re-
quired a link with the territory of the regulating Member State. 
It has been argued that the discrepancy between this case and 
Van den Burg indicates that the Court is willing to accept more 
far-reaching protection if the protected species forms a part of 
common EU heritage.
108
  
At the same time, two decisions regarding the permissi-
bility of export restrictions on animal welfare grounds seem to 
point to a more cautious approach where harmonized legislation 
is present. 
In Hedley Lomas and Compassion in World Farming, 
the ECJ had to deal with somewhat exotic PPM measures ap-
plied by the United Kingdom.
109
 Hedley Lomas concerned the 
United Kingdom’s refusal of a license to export live sheep to 
Spain because the authorities in the United Kingdom were not 
confident that Spanish slaughterhouses were up to EU standards 
for slaughtering.
110
 The Court’s rejection of the United King-
dom’s justification for the measure was largely based on the 
unilateral conduct by the United Kingdom authorities, an issue 
which will be returned to below.
111
 With regard to extraterritori-
ality, the Court’s message was somewhat difficult to read. The 
ECJ declined to make any specific statement with regard to the 
applicability of Article 36 to justify regulations aimed at pre-
venting harm outside of national borders. It did censure the 
United Kingdom for its attempt to enforce harmonized regula-
tions outside of its borders “solely on the conviction that a cer-
tain number of Spanish slaughterhouses were not complying 
with the requirements of the Directive itself and that there was 
at least a significant risk that animals exported to Spain would 
                                                 
108 See JOCHEM WIERS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE EC AND THE WTO 134 (1st ed. 
2002).  
109 See Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lo-
mas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-2553; see also Case C-1/96, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., 
Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in World Farming Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-1281. 
110 Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. at I-2606. 
111 See infra Part III.2.B. 
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undergo, upon slaughter, treatment contrary to the Directive.”112 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Léger argued that the United 
Kingdom was not in the best position to assert the conditions in 
slaughterhouses in Spain, an essentially evidential point.
113
 The 
ECJ, however, has used a similar argument to allow export re-
strictions based on protecting the quality and reputation of the 
exported product.
114
  
Compassion in World Farming, similarly, dealt with 
whether the United Kingdom could restrict the export of live 
veal calves to other Member States where they may be subject 
to poor living conditions.
115
 In this case, however, it was not as 
clear whether EU law completely harmonized the field. In his 
opinion, Advocate General Léger concluded that there was no 
harmonization, and that therefore export restrictions might be 
permitted.
116
 He also argued that Article 36 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) could only justify a 
restriction on the free movement of goods on the basis of inter-
ests located inside the territory of the Member State imposing 
restrictions.
117
 Thus, the United Kingdom’s export restrictions 
could be permitted on the ground of protecting public morality, 
but not on the grounds of public policy or protecting animal 
welfare.
118
 Interestingly, this amounts to an argument merely to 
redraft the interest as internally, rather than externally, di-
                                                 
112 Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. at I-2610. 
113 See, e.g., id. at I-2566 (Opinion of Advocate General Léger) (“I wish finally to point out, as 
the applicant company in the national proceedings has aptly noted, that if the United Kingdom 
had had proof that the directive was being infringed in some slaughterhouses . . . .”). 
114 Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financiën, 1995 E.C.R. I-1167, 1178–79; 
Case 89/76, Comm’n of the European Communities. v. Kingdom of the Neth., 1977 E.C.R. 
1355, 1360. 
115 See Case C-1/96, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion 
in World Farming Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I-1281, 1292. The case was a reference from proceedings 
brought by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and Compassion in 
World Farming against the United Kingdom’s Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, chal-
lenging the Minister’s refusal to restrict the export of veal calves to France on animal welfare 
grounds. Id. at I-1283. 
116 See id. at I-1268 (Opinion of Advocate General Léger). 
117 See id. at I-1269 (Opinion of Advocate General Léger). 
118 See id. at 1262–74 (Opinion of Advocate General Léger). 
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rected—a position that would broadly legitimize properly-
worded extraterritorial measures. 
The Court disagreed with the Advocate General, finding 
that there was indeed harmonization of animal welfare standards 
sufficient to preclude the United Kingdom from taking action in 
this field.
119
 Furthermore, the Court held that the United King-
dom’s actions justified on the grounds of public policy or public 
morality was also impermissible because it would undermine 
EU harmonization in the area of animal welfare.
120
 The ECJ al-
so made a stronger statement regarding extraterritorial action to 
protect the animal welfare: 
It is true that the Court ruled [previously] . . . that 
Community law, as it then stood, did not prevent 
a Member State from maintaining or introducing 
unilateral rules concerning the standards which 
had to be observed in the installation of enclo-
sures for fatting calves with a view to protecting 
the animals and which applied without distinc-
tion to calves intended for the national market 
and to calves intended for export.  
However, that judgment related to measures 
which a Member State applied only within its 
own territory. Furthermore, it was delivered be-
fore the Community legislature had adopted the 
Directive and was expressly founded on the ab-
sence, in the provisions governing the common 
organisation of the market, of any provision for 
                                                 
119 Compassion in World Farming Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. at I-1300. The United Kingdom, however, 
could take action as permitted by the harmonizing document. See id. (“[T]he fact that the Mem-
ber States are authorized to adopt within their own territory protective measures stricter than 
those laid down in a directive does not mean that the Directive has not exhaustively regulated 
the powers of the Member States in the area of the protection of veal calves . . . .”). 
120 Id. at I-1301 (“[A] Member State cannot rely on the views or the behavior of a section of na-
tional public opinion . . . in order unilaterally to challenge a harmonizing measure adopted by 
the Community institutions.”).  
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the protection of animals kept for farming pur-
poses. . . .
121
 
These animal welfare cases are ambiguous regarding ex-
traterritoriality. The Court does not seem to regard extraterrito-
rial protection as inevitably fatal to a measure, but rather as a 
factor arousing suspicion. That suspicion, however, does not 
center on the motives behind the measure and its legitimacy in 
principle, as the Advocates General discussed, but rather on its 
proportionality and effects on harmonization. The Court, one 
could suggest, is far more concerned about the practical juris-
dictional and evidential problems that extraterritorial protection 
might raise than about any principled or constitutional issue. 
This fundamentally pragmatic and flexible approach is 
also reflected the Court’s position in Alpine Investments, where 
the ECJ dealt with the question of whether a Dutch prohibition 
on cold calling services made from the Netherlands to other 
Member States could be justified on public interest grounds.
122
 
Specifically, the Netherlands argued that the prohibition served 
two public interest purposes: 1) safeguarding the reputation of 
Dutch financial markets; and 2) protecting the investing public, 
particularly in foreign states.
123
 The Court ruled that:  
Although the protection of consumers in the oth-
er Member States is not, as such, a matter for the 
Netherlands authorities, the nature and extent of 
that protection does none the less have a direct 
effect on the good reputation of Netherlands fi-
nancial services.  
Maintaining the good reputation of the national 
financial sector may therefore constitute an im-
perative reason of public interest capable of justi-
                                                 
121 Id. at I-1296. 
122 Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financiën, 1995 E.C.R. I-1167, 1172. 
123 Id. at I-1178. 
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fying restrictions on the freedom to provide fi-
nancial services.
124
  
This holding is interesting because like the Advocate 
General in Compassion in World Farming, the ECJ accepted the 
inwardly-directed reason (protecting the reputation of Dutch fi-
nancial markets) and rejected the externally-directed reason 
(protecting the investing public) for the regulation.
125
 This im-
plies that regulations directed solely at harms in other Member 
States would not be justifiable. At the same time, though, the 
Court did not reject the regulation merely because of its exter-
nally-directed component.
126
  
This would seem to indicate that so long as a regulation 
also protects an internal public interest, it can be justified as a 
derogation from Articles 34 and 35. And because, as discussed 
above, a PPM measure can almost always be re-characterized as 
either an internally or externally directed measure, this would 
leave open the door for the justification of any number of PPM 
measures, so long as proportionate to the internally-directed in-
terest at stake. The acceptance in Alpine Investments of 
“[m]aintaining the good reputation of the national financial sec-
tor . . . ,” for example, as a legitimate national concern justify-
ing trade restrictions, is a generous gesture. It goes a respectable 
distance towards merging the internal and the external.
127
 
This line of argument also underlies the ECJ’s recent 
judgment in Josemans.
128
 This case concerned the compatibility 
of local Dutch law prohibiting Dutch cannabis-selling ‘coffee-
shop’ owners from allowing customers not residing in the Neth-
erlands on their premises with EU law.
129
 A number of justifica-
                                                 
124 Id. at I-1179. 
125 Id. at I-1179–80. 
126 See id. at I-1180. 
127 Id. at I-1179. 
128 Case C-137/09, Josemans v. van Maastricht, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Dec. 16, 2010). 
129 Id. ¶ 15. Coffee-shops in the Netherlands are establishments where cannabis is sold and con-
sumed, although the marketing of non-alcoholic beverages and food is also a not inconsiderable 
activity.   
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tions were put forward to justify this restriction on the freedom 
to provide services within the EU, notably, not only by the 
Dutch government, but also by other Member States and the 
Commission.
130
 Although the Dutch authorities primarily based 
their defense on public interest grounds, namely the objective of 
combating drug tourism causing public nuisance, all the other 
governments that submitted observations to the ECJ argued that 
the interest of restricting access of non-residents in the Nether-
lands to coffee-shops was not solely confined to a particular 
‘Dutch’ interest, but also related to interests of other Member 
States and of the EU at large.
131
The other Member States re-
ferred to “the public order problems to which that phenomenon, 
including the illegal export of cannabis, gives rise in Member 
States other than the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in particular 
in neighbouring States.”132 In addition, the German government 
took the view that the restriction could be justified on grounds 
of public health.
133
 The ECJ agreed and held that: 
It must be pointed out that combating drug tour-
ism and the accompanying public nuisance is 
part of combating drugs. It concerns both the 
maintenance of public order and the protection 
of the health of citizens, at the level of the Mem-
ber States and also of the European Union. 
Given the commitments entered into by the Eu-
ropean Union and its Member States, there is no 
doubt that the abovementioned objectives consti-
tute a legitimate interest which, in principle, jus-
tifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by 
European Union law, even under a fundamental 
freedom such as the freedom to provide services. 
                                                 
130 Id. ¶¶ 60–66 (stating that the German Government and other European Union Member States 
believe that the Commissions restrictions are justifiable on public policy grounds). 
131 See Id. ¶ 64.  
132 Id.  
133 Case C-137/09, Josemans v. van Maastricht, 2010 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS (Dec. 16, 
2010).,¶ 61. 
2012] DIVERGING EU AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 53 
 
In that connection, it is important to bear in 
mind, as is apparent from paragraphs 11, 37 and 
38 of this judgment, that the need to combat 
drugs has been recognised by various interna-
tional conventions which the Member States, and 
even the European Union, have cooperated on or 
acceded to. The preambles to those instruments 
mention the danger to the health and well-being 
of individuals constituted, in particular, by de-
mand for and the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances, as well as their 
harmful effects on the economic, cultural and po-
litical bases of society. 
Furthermore, the need to fight drugs, in particu-
lar by preventing drug addiction and punishing 
the illicit trafficking in such products or sub-
stances, has been set out in Article 152(1) EC 
and in Articles 29 EU and 31 EU. As regards 
provisions of secondary law, the first recital in 
the preamble to Framework Decision 2004/757 
states that illicit drug trafficking poses a threat to 
health, safety and the quality of life of citizens of 
the European Union, and to the legal economy, 
stability and security of the Member States. Fur-
thermore, as is apparent from paragraph 10 of 
this judgment, certain instruments of the Europe-
an Union relate expressly to the prevention of 
drug tourism.
134
 
The ECJ also accepted restrictions on exports on the ba-
sis of events occurring outside of the regulating Member State’s 
territory in three cases dealing with export restrictions of certain 
goods for reasons relating to public security. These are not PPM 
cases as such, but they address the extent to which events and 
behavior in another territory are the legitimate concern of a reg-
                                                 
134 Id. ¶¶ 65–68 (emphasis added). 
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ulating state. As in Alpine Investments, the Court’s approach in 
these cases was that the permissibility of the regulation depend-
ed on the degree to which there was a connection with a domes-
tic interest. In Richardt, the Court found that the seizure by 
Luxembourg authorities of strategic material in transit through 
the country was permitted on grounds of public securi-
ty.According to the Court: 
[T]he concept of public security within the 
meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty covers both a 
Member State's internal security and its external 
security. It is common ground that the importa-
tion, exportation and transit of goods capable of 
being used for strategic purposes may affect the 
public security of a Member State, which it is 
therefore entitled to protect pursuant to Article 
36 of the Treaty.
135
  
In the Werner and Leifer cases, the Court reviewed the 
export restrictions of two so-called “dual-use goods” (a vacuum 
induction oven and chemicals) from Germany to Libya and Iraq, 
respectively.
136
 The Court held that these export restrictions 
were permitted for reasons of public security because “the risk 
of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coex-
istence of nations may affect the security of a Member State.”137 
Advocate General Jacobs argued in his Opinion in Leifer that 
such an export restriction was also permitted for the reason of 
protecting health and lives of people outside Germany. He ar-
gued that:  
[I]t cannot have been [the Council’s] intention 
only to allow the Member States to protect the 
health and lives of their own nationals. As a rule, 
                                                 
135 Case C-367/89, Criminal proceedings against Richardt & Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC, 
1991 E.C.R. I-04621, ¶ 22 (referring to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity). 
136 Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner Industrie- Ausrüstungen GmbH v. Germany, 1995 E.C.R. I-
03218; Case C-83/94 Peter Leifer, Reinhold Otto Krauskopf, Otto Holzer, 1995 E.C.R. I-03235. 
137 See Werner, 1995 E.C.R. I-3218, ¶ 27; Leifer, 1995 E.C.R. I-3235, ¶ 28. 
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of course, a Member State will in the first place 
act so as to protect its own citizens. Where how-
ever a war is waged between certain third coun-
tries, entailing a great deal of bloodshed, it would 
be indefensible to interpret Article 11 of the Ex-
port Regulation
138
 as not allowing certain export 
restrictions aimed at not aggravating the loss of 
life.
139
 
The Court did not approve this reasoning, preferring to 
justify the measures by reference to domestic interests.
140
 Yet in 
several waste export cases the Court has considered restrictions 
on waste export without referring to any domestic interest, ap-
parently accepting in principle the desire to protect the envi-
ronment of another Member State.
141
 Some of these restrictions 
have been overruled on proportionality or evidential issues, but 
not because the threatened environmental harm was in another 
state.
142
  
These cases on the export of waste show that Member 
States may take extraterritorial protection of non-trade concerns 
into account, but only in so far as the Member State of dispatch 
can prove, on the basis of relevant scientific research, that the 
                                                 
138 Advocate General Jacobs argued that Article 11 of the Export Regulation in the Treaty 
should be interpreted similarly to Article 36 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”). He states, ‘similar principles should, as I shall suggest, govern the interpreta-
tion of both [Article 36 and Article 11 of the export regulation], and guidance can therefore be 
provided by the judgment of the Court in Richardt….”). Werner, 1995 E.C.R. I-3218 ¶ 35 
(Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs). 
139 Id. ¶¶ 58–59. 
140 See Werner, 1995 E.C.R. I-03218, Court decision; Leifer, 1995 E.C.R. I-03235, Court deci-
sion ¶¶ 2–3. 
141 See, e.g., Case C-277/02, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Management-
Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-11987.; Case 118/86, Openbaar Ministerie v. 
Nertsvoederfabriek Nederland B.V., 1987 E.C.R. 3883 [hereinafter Nertsvoederfabriek]; Case 
172/82, Syndicat national des fabricants raffineurs d’huile de graissage v. Groupement d'intérêt 
économique "Inter-Huiles", 1983 E.C.R. 555 [hereinafter Inter-Huiles]; Case C-203/96 Chem-
ische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV v. Minister Van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en 
Milieubeheer, 1998 E.C.R. I-04075; Case 153/78, Comm’n of the European Communities v. 
Fed. Rep. of Ger., 1979 E.C.R. 2555, ¶ 41. 
142 See Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp, 1998 E.C.R. I-04075; Nertsvoederfabriek, 1987 
E.C.R. 3883; Inter-Huiles, 1983 E.C.R. 555. 
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export of waste may cause harm, and that it does not require the 
importing Member State to have higher standards than the state 
of export.
143
  
Externally, EU law is less ambiguous. The Treaties pro-
vide explicit support for an evangelical EU, seeking to spread 
its values and world view beyond its own borders. PPM 
measures are in this context logical and fitting. Article 3(5) of 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the goals of the 
EU in its relations with the wider world:  
In its relations with the wider world, the Union 
shall uphold and promote its values and interests 
and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It 
shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable 
development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradi-
cation of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well 
as to the strict observance and the development 
of international law, including respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter.
144
 
Moreover, the EU has also consciously chosen to throw 
its ideological weight behind the idea of soft power or norma-
tive power in international relations, and the use of economic 
influence rather than military influence as a tool of development 
and social change. As early as the 1970s, scholars like François 
Duchêne argued that the European Community represented a 
“new stage of political civilisation” that would influence inter-
national affairs not through military might, but rather through 
“essentially civilian forms of power” such as economic and for-
eign policy instruments.
145
 And more recently, Ian Manners’s 
                                                 
143 See EU-Wood-Trading, 2004 E.C.R. I-111987. 
144 TEU, supra note 4, art. 3.5. 
145 François Duchêne, The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence, in A 
NATION WRIT LARGE? FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 19 
(Max Kohnstamm & Wolfgang Hager eds., 1973). 
2012] DIVERGING EU AND WTO PERSPECTIVES 57 
 
concept of “Normative Power Europe” has gained ground as an 
explanation of the EU’s ability to influence international affairs 
by “redefin[ing] international norms in its own image.”146 
EU officials point to the relatively smooth transition 
from communist dictatorship to liberal democracy of the Central 
and Eastern European Member States as an example of the posi-
tive effects of economic engagement and the coupling of the 
economic and non-economic.
147
 This approach is also applied in 
relations with Turkey and North Africa,
148
 and more widely, as 
the EU seeks to attach human rights and other conditions to its 
trade and economic relations with third states.
149
 The EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) gives developing 
countries preferential access to the EU market in the form of re-
duced tariffs on goods, and although there is no expectation that 
this preferential treatment is reciprocated, the GSP+ regime, 
which is more beneficial, only applies when a developing coun-
try has ratified and effectively implemented 27 international 
agreements on labor standards, sustainable development, good 
governance and human rights.
150
 
It is evident, then, that the idea of making trade condi-
tional on compliance with social and environmental norms is 
not new to European foreign policy thinking. As Kalypso Nico-
                                                 
146 Manners, supra note 22, at 252. There is some debate about the conceptual relationship be-
tween civilian, soft, and normative power that will not be entered into here. 
147 See Jacques Delors, President of the European Comm’n, Address at the College of Europe in 
Bruges (Oct. 17, 1989), available at 
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/Address_given_by_Jacques_Delors_Bruges_17_October_1989-en-
5bbb1452-92c7-474ba7cf-a2d281898295.html (arguing that the existence of the EC as an ex-
ample of a Community based on the rule of law, a democratic entity and a buoyant economy 
was the model and the catalyst for the changes in the eastern European states). 
148 See, e.g., Thomas Diez, Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Norma-
tive Power Europe’, 33 MILLENNIUM: J. INT’L STUD. 613, 630–33 (2005) (describing the export 
of European values to North Africa through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and to Turkey 
via its candidacy for EU-membership). 
149 See generally Karen E. Smith, The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: 
‘Foreign Policy’ with an Ethical Dimension?, in ETHICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 185 (Karen E. 
Smith & Margot Light eds., 2001) (describing the linkage of trade and human rights in EU for-
eign policy since the 1980s). 
150 See generally Council Regulation 732/2008, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Pref-
erences, 2008 O.J. (L 211) 1 (EC).  
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laïdis and Robert Howse note, “[t]he projection of Europe’s 
Utopia on to the rest of the world has a long history and many 
labels, from enlightenment to colonialism, civic imperialism, or 
‘civilian power’.”151 From this perspective, PPMs fit entirely 
within the EU’s external economic mind-set. They are, in a 
sense, merely one more mechanism in the soft power toolkit.  
And indeed, the EU has been willing to use PPMs to 
spread its values. Recently, the EU has adopted a regulation lay-
ing down the obligations of operators who place timber and 
timber products on the market.
152
 The regulation tries to check 
harm that takes place outside EU territory, although there is also 
a nexus with EU concerns such as climate change and biodiver-
sity. The regulation recognizes that: 
Illegal logging is a pervasive problem of major 
international concern. It poses a significant threat 
to forests as it contributes to the process of de-
forestation and forest degradation, which is re-
sponsible for about 20 % of global CO2 emis-
sions, threatens biodiversity, and undermines 
sustainable forest management and development 
including the commercial viability of operators 
acting in accordance with applicable legislation. 
It also contributes to desertification and soil ero-
sion and can exacerbate extreme weather events 
and flooding. In addition, it has social, political 
and economic implications, often undermining 
progress towards good governance and threaten-
ing the livelihood of local forest-dependent 
communities, and it can be linked to armed con-
flicts. Combating the problem of illegal logging 
in the context of this Regulation is expected to 
contribute to the Union’s climate change mitiga-
tion efforts in a cost-effective manner and should 
                                                 
151 Nicoaïdis & Howse, supra note 81, at 767. 
152 Council Regulation 995/2010, Timber Regulation 2010 O.J. (L 295) 23 (EU). 
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be seen as complementary to Union action and 
commitments in the context of the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.
153
  
The regulation explicitly addresses concerns located out-
side EU territory, by prohibiting the marketing of timber har-
vested illegally in third countries.
154
 The regulation also re-
quires traders to identify from whom they have obtained the 
timber, and to whom they have supplied timber.
155
 In addition, 
the regulation obliges operators to use a ‘due diligence sys-
tem’156 which: 
[S]hould provide access to information about the 
sources and suppliers of the timber and timber 
products being placed on the internal market for 
the first time, including relevant information 
such as compliance with the applicable legisla-
tion, the country of harvest, species, quantity, 
and where applicable sub-national region and 
concession of harvest.
157
  
2. Unilateralism 
A. The WTO 
Even more so than with regard to extraterritoriality, the 
WTO has been quite hostile to the notion of unilateral action to 
prevent extrajurisdictional harm. The concept of multilateralism 
is of fundamental importance to the WTO. It forms one of the 
bedrock principles of the organization, and frames the institu-
tional pursuit of negotiated concessions. Indeed, as John Ruggie 
famously described it, the philosophy of embedded liberalism 
                                                 
153 Id. at pmbl. ¶ 3. 
154 Id. art. 4. 
155 Id. art. 5. 
156 Id. art. 6 and 4 ¶ 2. 
157 Id. at pmbl. ¶ 17. 
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that characterized the GATT was founded on the twin principles 
of “multilateralism and safeguarding domestic stability.”158 Uni-
lateral Member State PPMs undermine this philosophy and cre-
ate potential openings for protectionism and the nullification of 
bargained trade concessions, threatening the all-important equi-
librium among Member States.  
It is unsurprising, then, that the WTO cases most explic-
itly dealing with the PPM issue have focused on unilateralism as 
a primary concern. Philippe Sands has argued that one of the 
reasons why the GATT panel in US—Tuna rejected the unilat-
eral imposition by the US of the manner in which tuna might be 
caught was because “it was concerned with the imposition by 
one state (community) of its values (dolphin conservation) on 
another state (community) without that other state having had 
an opportunity to contribute to the elaboration of those values or 
their elevation to international acceptability.”159 And the deci-
sion in US—Shrimp stressed the failure of the US to engage in 
multilateral negotiations as the primary reason for rejecting the 
turtle protection measure: 
The unjustifiable nature of this discrimination 
emerges clearly when we consider the cumula-
tive effects of the failure of the United States to 
pursue negotiations for establishing consensual 
means of protection and conservation of the liv-
ing marine resources here involved. . . . The 
principal consequence of this failure may be seen 
in the resulting unilateralism evident in the ap-
plication of [the measure]. As we have empha-
sized earlier, the policies relating to the necessity 
for use of particular kinds of [Turtle Excluder 
Devices] in various maritime areas, and the oper-
ating details of these policies, are all shaped by 
                                                 
158 John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberal-
ism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 396 (1982). 
159 Sands, supra note 47, at 295. 
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the Department of State, without the participa-
tion of the exporting Members. The system and 
processes of certification are established and ad-
ministered by the United States agencies alone. 
The decision-making involved in the grant, deni-
al or withdrawal of certification to the exporting 
Members, is, accordingly, also unilateral. The 
unilateral character of the application of [the 
measure] heightens the disruptive and discrimi-
natory influence of the import prohibition and 
underscores its unjustifiability.
160
  
Even more clearly, the SPS and TBT agreements both 
create a presumption in favor of multilaterally agreed product 
standards, and require states that wish to regulate more strictly 
to provide scientific evidence for their regulatory choices.
161
 
Today, according to Sands, unilateralism seems to be 
acceptable within the GATT only if three criteria have been 
met. First, a state taking a unilateral measure should have a le-
gitimate interest in the concern it is seeking to protect. Second, 
that concern must be the subject of international action. Third, 
the state taking the unilateral measure must have exhausted ef-
forts to find a solution through diplomacy either bilaterally or 
multilaterally.
162
 
B. The EU 
One would expect that the EU, which is fundamentally 
built upon cooperation between Member States, would be reluc-
                                                 
160 US—Shrimp, supra note 5, ¶ 172.  
161 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 
3.2, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, World Trade 
Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Nego-
tiations (1999) [hereinafter SPS Agreement]; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 
15, 1994, art. 2.4, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. But cf. Appellate 
Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 227, WT/DS231/AB/R 
(Sept. 26, 2002) (noting that a standard does not need to be adopted by consensus to qualify as 
“international”). 
162 Sands, supra note 47, at 300. 
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tant to allow unilateral trade measures by its Member States. In 
particular, Article 4, paragraph 3 of TEU requires the EU and its 
Member States, “pursuant to the principle of sincere coopera-
tion . . . in full mutual respect, [to] assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Treaties.”163 The principle of sin-
cere cooperation also requires Member States to “take any ap-
propriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the 
acts of the institutions of the Union” and to “facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objec-
tives.”164 
As was the case with extraterritoriality, however, the 
ECJ has seemed much more concerned with the effects of uni-
lateralism on harmonization than with unilateralism in a formal 
or fundamental sense.  
For example, in Hedley Lomas, the case in which the 
United Kingdom refused to grant a license for the export of live 
sheep to Spanish slaughterhouses, the ECJ held that: “A Mem-
ber State may not unilaterally adopt, on its own authority, cor-
rective or protective measures designed to obviate any breach 
by another Member State of rules of [EU] law.”165 Initially, it 
may seem that this case points toward a refusal by the Court to 
accept unilateralism as a legitimate course of action by Member 
States. However, the ECJ found the UK action impermissible 
because slaughterhouse standards had been harmonized by EU 
legislation.
166
 The ECJ’s key concern was not with unilateral ac-
tion to protect animal welfare, but with unilateral action in a 
sphere harmonized by EU law. As the Court wrote: “[r]ecourse 
to Article 36 is no longer possible where Community directives 
provide for harmonization of the measures necessary to achieve 
                                                 
163 TEU, supra note 4, art. 4. 
164 Id. 
165 Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries and Food ex parte Hedley Lomas, 
1996 E.C.R. I-2553, ¶ 20. 
166 Id. 
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the specific objective which would be furthered by reliance up-
on this provision.”167  
Advocate General Léger, agreed, noting that “nothing 
was more alien to [EU] law than the idea of a measure of retali-
ation or reciprocity proper to classical public international law,” 
and that EU law prohibits Member States from taking the law 
into their own hands.
168
 However, the Advocate General’s opin-
ion, too, was much more concerned with the regulation’s impact 
on the harmonization process than it was with unilateral conduct 
in the absence of harmonization.
169
 
By contrast, the Court in Compassion in World Farming, 
involving the UK’s refusal to export veal calves to states with 
poorer living conditions, emphasized that unilateralism may be 
permissible in cases where the EU had not moved to harmonize 
internal market law or where the harmonizing legislation specif-
ically permitted unilateral action.
170
 
In Gourmetterie Van den Burg, a case involving the 
Dutch ban on sales of red grouse, Advocate General van Gerven 
objected to the Dutch regulation because of its effects on Mem-
ber States’ mutual confidence in each other’s legislation and 
willingness to cooperate. He states, “a measure unilaterally 
adopted by one Member State in connection with the hunting of 
animals in another Member State would seem at first sight to be 
difficult to reconcile with the principle of mutual confidence be-
tween Member States when they give effect to a Community di-
rective in their legislation.”171 However, the main thrust of his 
argument focused on the lack of proportionality of the unilateral 
de facto import ban in light of the fact that protecting the red 
grouse was not a Community objective:  
                                                 
167 Id. ¶ 18. 
168 Hedley Lomas, 1996 E.C.R. I-2553 (Opinion of Advocate General Léger),. 
169 Id. ¶¶ 39–40.  
170 See Compassion in World Farming Limited, 1998 E.C.R. I-1251. 
171 Case C-169/89, Criminal proceedings against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. I-
2143, ¶ 7 (Opinion of Advocate General van Gerven). 
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The restriction of intra-Community trade result-
ing from an absolute prohibition of imports in the 
Netherlands is out of proportion, in my view, to 
the small contribution which such a prohibition 
is capable of making in concreto—by discourag-
ing the killing of the bird species in question in 
the United Kingdom—to the achievement of the 
objective pursued, namely the improvement of 
stocks of bird species which is not endangered 
and whose protection is not a priority under 
Community law. That is so particularly since the 
measure under consideration and the obstacle to 
trade resulting therefrom are intended to protect 
a bird and thus, contrary to the principle of mu-
tual confidence between States, to take effect on 
the territory of another Member State; moreover, 
the measure was adopted on the basis of a unilat-
eral appraisal of the interests involved, that is to 
say without taking account of interests which 
may warrant or justify the hunting of that spe-
cies.
172
  
An issue central to these cases is whether the challenged 
measures pursue objectives that are also EU objectives. Where a 
unilateral Member State action has the effect of interfering with 
EU action, as in the cases above, it is not permitted. However, 
where unilateral action helps to promote an EU objective, the 
Court has indicated that unilateral action may be acceptable. In-
deed, in several cases the Court seemed to welcome such unilat-
eral national initiatives.  
Preussen Elektra is a particularly good example of this 
behavior. The ECJ upheld a German law requiring electricity 
suppliers to purchase a certain percentage of energy from re-
newable sources at a minimum price higher than that of electric-
                                                 
172 Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). 
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ity on the German market.
173
 The Court ruled that although the 
German law unilaterally restricted intra-EU trade, it was justi-
fied because the measure was “useful for protecting the envi-
ronment” and the use of renewable energy sources which it was 
intended to promote “contributes to the reduction in emissions 
of greenhouse gases which are amongst the main causes of cli-
mate change which the European Community and its Member 
States have pledged to combat.”174 The Court referred to the 
Treaty articles regarding environmental policy,
175
 and went on 
at considerable length discussing EU and international measures 
addressing climate change
176
 and EU measures regulating the 
electricity market while taking the environment into account.
177
 
The fact that the German measure pushed forward a community 
goal in the absence of harmonization was enough to ensure that 
its unilateral nature would be accepted.  
This welcoming approach may be the result of the EU’s 
distinctive institutional context. Unlike the WTO, the EU has 
the capacity to harmonize—to legislate for the entire EU area on 
a wide range of subjects—wherever necessary for the function-
ing of the internal market. A unilateral Member State PPM ini-
tiative creates free movement problems within that market, as 
products from laxer states find access to markets in stricter 
states restricted. However, precisely this fact triggers EU com-
petence to take the necessary harmonizing measures. The EU 
legislature is empowered to regulate when differences exist be-
tween national rules that could obstruct fundamental freedoms 
and thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the internal 
                                                 
173 Case C-376/98, Preussen Elektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-2099. See generally 
Ann Goossens & Sam Emmerechts, Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 
Judgment of the Full Court of 13 March 2001, 38 COMMON MKT L. REV. 991 (2001) (discuss-
ing Preussen Elektra). 
174 Preussen Elektra, 2001 E.C.R. I-2099, ¶ 73. 
175 Id. ¶ 76. 
176 Id. ¶ 74. 
177 Id. ¶¶ 77–80. 
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market or could cause significant distortions of competition.
178
 
Usually if a significant number of states have adopted or are 
considering adopting a measure of a given sort this is an indica-
tion that substantial political will is present, and there is a good 
chance of bringing less active states on board. This often results 
in a new, broader EU norm. This process is aided by the realiza-
tion of most states that if they begin to take unilateral action 
they will harm the free movement from which they all generally 
benefit. Thus, if the EU wishes to pursue a given policy, unilat-
eral Member State action in that area can be an opportunity ra-
ther than a threat, as it creates the awareness of the issue, justi-
fies EU intervention, and identifies Member States who are 
prepared to provide active support for regulation of the issue in 
question. 
A perfect example of unilateral Member State action that 
led to EU-wide legislation is the evolution of the EU regulation 
on trade in seal products.
179
 Several years ago, Belgium and the 
Netherlands enacted legislation prohibiting trade in seals and 
seal products on animal welfare grounds.
180
 These national laws 
created barriers to the free movement of goods within the EU. 
However, rather than challenging the measures before the ECJ, 
the EU legislature took the opportunity to implement harmoniz-
ing legislation. This chain of reasoning is described in Regula-
tion 1007/2009: 
In response to concerns of citizens and consum-
ers about the animal welfare aspects of the kill-
ing and skinning of seals and the possible pres-
ence on the market of products obtained from 
animals killed and skinned in a way that causes 
                                                 
178 Case C-58/08, The Queen on the application of Vodafone Ltd v. Secretary of State, 2010 
E.C.R. I-04999, ¶¶ 32–33; Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parlia-
ment & Council of the European Union, 2000 E.C.R. I-8419, ¶¶ 49–51. 
179 Parliament & Council Regulation 1007/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36 (EU). 
180See Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and 
why the WTO Should Permit Trade Restrictions Justified by Non-Instrumental Moral Values 
(N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper no. 316, 2011), available at 
lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=nyu_plltwp.  
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pain, distress, fear and other forms of suffering, 
several Member States have adopted or intend to 
adopt legislation regulating trade in seal products 
by prohibiting import and production of such 
products, while no restrictions are place on trade 
in these products in other Member States.  
There are therefore differences between national 
provisions governing the trade, import, produc-
tion and marketing of seal products. Those dif-
ferences adversely affect the operation of the in-
ternal market in products which contain or may 
contain seal products, and constitute barriers to 
trade in such products. . . .  
The measures provided for in this Regulation 
should therefore harmonise the rules across the 
Community as regards commercial activities 
concerning seal products, and thereby prevent 
the disturbance of the internal market in the 
products concerned, including products equiva-
lent to, or substitutable, for seal products.
181
 
Thus, internally, unilateral measures that further a 
Community goal are sometimes welcomed as opportunities for 
the EU to adopt harmonizing legislation. In the institutional en-
vironment of the EU, unilateral action can become a pathway 
toward, rather than an obstacle to, multilateral action. 
Externally, the EU has asserted a strong commitment to 
multilateralism in a number of contexts.
182
 However, it has also 
been willing to take unilateral measures when important issues 
                                                 
181 Parliament & Council Regulation 1007/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36 (EU), ¶¶ 5–8. 
182 See, e.g., Sibylle Scheipers & Daniela Sicurelli, Normative Power Europe: A Credible Uto-
pia?, 45 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 435, 441–48 (2007) (describing the EU’s commitment to mul-
tilateralism in the context of the ICC negotiations and the development of the Kyoto Protocol). 
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are at stake.
183
 Bernhard Jansen, a Legal Advisor to the Europe-
an Commission, summarized the European position: 
[S]tates are allowed in some limited circum-
stances under existing public international law to 
prosecute and punish criminal offences commit-
ted outside their own jurisdiction. Examples in-
clude piracy, slave trade, hijacking of aircraft, 
genocide, war crimes and certain acts of terror-
ism. With regard to conservation measures, the 
relevant questions would be whether there is an 
internationally agreed conservation method, 
whether there is an imminent threat of extinction 
or severe and irreversible damage to a rare or en-
dangered species, and the importance of that spe-
cies for the universal ‘genetic pool’. If it can be 
shown by applying these criteria, or other criteria 
which environmental experts may be able to de-
velop, that the damage to, or the extinction of, a 
rare or endangered species has effects beyond the 
territory of the state in which that species lives, 
we are prepared in Europe as well to consider 
this as a matter of international concern which 
might justify action beyond the boundaries of a 
classic approach to the limits imposed on states 
by the territoriality principle. However, as this 
example shows, we are only prepared to consider 
a more flexible interpretation of the territoriality 
principle in situations where international coop-
eration and widely accepted international agree-
ments cannot be reached sufficiently in time in 
order to achieve an internationally recognized 
purpose.
184
 
                                                 
183 See van Calster, supra note 65, at 14. 
184 Bernhard Jansen, The Limits of Unilateralism from a European Perspective, 11EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 309, 313 (2000). 
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The rhetoric of multilateral preference is less significant 
than two other aspects of this passage: the perceived autonomy 
to interpret internationally recognized goals, such as species 
conservation, and the reservation of the right to act unilaterally 
in pursuance of such an interpretation. Formulating unilateral 
action as a necessary evil indicates that it is seen as a continuing 
right. Indeed, if a sufficient condition for unilateralism is that 
“widely accepted international agreements cannot be reached 
sufficiently in time in order to achieve an internationally recog-
nized purpose,”185 then the EU is reserving very nearly a carte 
blanche. 
Several EU regulations and communications support the 
idea that Europe is not averse to acting unilaterally to protect 
what it deems to be universal values. For example, the Commis-
sion noted in an early communication on the process/product 
distinction that: 
The need to ensure that environmental protection 
can be enforced when there is the risk of irrepa-
rable harm to the environment of another state or 
the global commons, while at the same time dis-
pelling the risk of giving leeway to possible pro-
tectionist abuses, is the most challenging task of 
the international community in the debate on 
trade and the environment. The Commission 
considers that there may be specific exceptional 
circumstances in which the rules of the multilat-
eral trading system should not preclude the adop-
tion of relevant trade measures against a country 
which is violating some fundamental legal duties 
under international environmental law, such as 
the obligation to ensure that activities within its 
jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environ-
ment of other States and the obligation to coop-
erate to conserve, protect and restore the health 
                                                 
185 Id. at 311. 
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and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem (Principles 
2 and 7 of the Rio Declaration). But trade 
measures must be based on rigorous scientific 
evidence, be proportional to the objectives 
sought and implemented in a transparent manner: 
they should be considered as last resort 
measures, once attempts to find other bilateral 
and multilateral solutions have been exhaust-
ed.
186
 
The newly drafted EU-wide regulation prohibiting the 
marketing of illegally harvested timber justifies unilateral action 
to protect global timber supplies by noting its consistency with 
international norms:  
Illegal logging is a pervasive problem of major 
international concern. It poses a significant threat 
to forests as it contributes to the process of de-
forestation and forest degradation, which is re-
sponsible for about 20 % of global CO2 emis-
sions, threatens biodiversity, and undermines 
sustainable forest management and development 
including the commercial viability of operators 
acting in accordance with applicable legislation. 
It also contributes to desertification and soil ero-
sion and can exacerbate extreme weather events 
and flooding. In addition, it has social, political 
and economic implications, often undermining 
progress towards good governance and threaten-
ing the livelihood of local forest-dependent 
communities, and it can be linked to armed con-
flicts. Combating the problem of illegal logging 
in the context of this Regulation is expected to 
contribute to the Union’s climate change mitiga-
tion efforts in a cost-effective manner and should 
                                                 
186 Commission Communication to the Council and to the Parliament on Trade and Environ-
ment, at 14, COM (1996) 54 final (Feb. 28, 1996). 
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be seen as complementary to Union action and 
commitments in the context of the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.
187
 
The regulation goes on to mention the EU’s support of 
international efforts to eliminate illegal logging and associated 
trade through Voluntary Partnership Agreements and the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES).
188
 The regulation thus falls within the 
context of international cooperation to combat forest degrada-
tion. Note that under TFEU Member States are allowed to adopt 
more stringent measures.
189
  
Regulation 1007/2009 relating to trade in seal products, 
similarly, does not shy away from unilateral international action 
for the protection of animal welfare. Though it makes no refer-
ence to internationally agreed standards of animal welfare, it 
does reference the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples to justify its exception for indigenous hunts
190
 and 
seems heavily influenced by the perception of the European 
public.
191
 Morality and animal welfare are two of the primary 
reasons for the regulation.
192
  
Whether it sees itself as protecting important universal 
values or as the flag-bearer of the normative vanguard, the EU 
has been willing to set aside its rhetorical commitment to multi-
lateralism on several occasions.  
3. Non-Trade Issues 
                                                 
187 Parliament & Council Regulation 995/2010, pmbl. recital 4, 2010 O.J. (L 295) 23, 23. 
188 Id. at recitals 5–10. 
189 Article 193 of TFEU reads: “The protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 192 shall 
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective 
measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They shall be notified to the 
Commission.” TFEU, supra note 3, art. 193. 
190Parliament & Council Regulation 1007/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36 (EU), ¶ 14. 
191 See, e.g., id. at pmbl. recital 4. 
192 Id. at pmbl. recitals 1, 4.  
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A. The WTO 
Many WTO Member States are resistant to the idea of 
integrating non-trade concerns into the trade system. As the 
WTO Secretariat once stated: “The WTO is not an environmen-
tal protection agency and . . . does not aspire to become one.”193 
For the WTO, international trade regulation is an inappropriate 
forum for tackling PPM issues. Ecuador, for example, has 
charged that: “The issue of PPMs was often used by developed 
countries to restrict market access for some products based on 
environmental, labour, sanitary or phytosanitary criteria, among 
others.”194 Australia has noted its belief that “PPMs reflected 
the specific economic, social and environmental conditions of 
individual countries, and, as such, were best dealt with at the na-
tional level rather than in the WTO.”195 According to this view, 
integrating non-trade concerns into the WTO system muddies 
the clarity of international economic law and undermines the re-
ciprocal system of trade concessions, permitting countries to ar-
gue their way out of commitments on social grounds that were 
not agreed to by all Member States. 
Nicolaïdis and Howse convincingly argued that this re-
sistance was present in the political philosophy of the GATT 
(characterized by John Ruggie as “embedded liberalism”),196 as 
they described “a conception of the complementarity between 
bargained trade liberalization, on the one hand, and the evolu-
tion of the domestic welfare and regulatory state, on the oth-
er.”197 Australia has noted its belief that “PPMs reflected the 
specific economic, social and environmental conditions of indi-
vidual countries, and, as such, were best dealt with at the na-
                                                 
193 WTO Secretariat, Trade and Environment at the WTO, at 6 (Apr. 2004), available at 
http://www.wto.org/ english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_env_e.pdf. 
194 Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment, Summary Report on the Twen-
ty-First Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, ¶ 48, 
TN/TE/R/21 (Apr. 29, 2008). 
195 Id. ¶ 59. 
196 Ruggie, supra note 158, at 399. 
197 Nicoaïdis & Howse, supra note 81 776–77. 
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tional level rather than in the WTO.”198 According to this view, 
integrating non-trade concerns into the WTO system muddies 
the clarity of international economic law and undermines the re-
ciprocal system of trade concessions, permitting countries to ar-
gue their way out of commitments on social grounds that were 
not agreed to by all Member States. 
Nicolaïdis and Howse have convincingly argued that 
this resistance was bound up with the political philosophy of the 
GATT, characterized by John Ruggie as “embedded liberal-
ism,” “a conception of the complementarity between bargained 
trade liberalization, on the one hand, and the evolution of the 
domestic welfare and regulatory state, on the other.”199 In this 
vision, social politics are a matter of domestic concern, and in-
tegrating such concerns into the international trade regime 
would be counter to the strategy of promoting multilateralism 
and tolerating domestic difference. Robert Howse argues else-
where that this was the basis behind some criticism of the US—
Tuna I and US—Shrimp decisions: “To many people around the 
world, the panels had blown up exactly what they had been try-
ing to preserve—the notion of trade liberalization as consistent 
with deep regulatory diversity, accommodating a full range of 
noneconomic public values.”200  
Though contested, this value system is still clearly in ev-
idence at the WTO. Indeed, as Director-General of the WTO 
Pascal Lamy wrote in 2005: 
Pursuant to the WTO, each Member is free to de-
termine the values to which it gives priority and 
the level of protection it deems adequate for such 
values. This would include any societal value 
elected by a WTO Member… [T]he only control 
                                                 
198 Committeee on Trade and Environment, supra note 194,¶ 59. 
199 Nicoaïdis & Howse, supra note 81, 776. See also Ruggie, supra note 158, at 399 (describing 
the “essence of embedded liberalism” as the attempt “to devise a form of multilateralism that is 
compatible with the requirements of domestic stability.”). 
200 Howse & Regan, supra note 59, at 103. 
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exercised by the WTO is whether the member is 
in good faith when invoking such non-trade val-
ues or whether it is hiding a protectionist device. 
This control is exercised by the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism. This WTO dispute set-
tlement mechanism has not up to now given 
trade policy rules precedence over other multilat-
eral rules.
201
 
The 1996 Singapore declaration is an interesting exam-
ple of how the WTO deals with non-trade concerns that concern 
social and labor rights. The Ministerial Conference stated in this 
declaration: 
We renew our commitment to the observance of 
internationally recognized core labor standards. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is 
the competent body to set and deal with these 
standards, and we affirm our support for its work 
in promoting them. We believe that economic 
growth and development fostered by increased 
trade and further trade liberalization contribute to 
the promotion of these standards. We reject the 
use of labor standards for protectionist purposes, 
and agree that the comparative advantage of 
countries, particularly low-wage developing 
countries, must in no way be put into question. In 
this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Sec-
retariats will continue their existing collabora-
tion.
202
 
In this spirit, the WTO has been reluctant to admit any 
‘political’ value judgment to enter into its decision-making pro-
                                                 
201 Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, Towards Global Govern-
ance?, Speech Before at the Master of Public Affairs Inaugural Lecture at the Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques de Paris (Oct, 21, 2005) quoted in Jenny Schultz & Rachel Ball, Trade as a Weapon? 
The WTO and Human Rights-Based Trade Measures, 12 DEAKIN L. REV. 41, 41 (2007). 
202 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Singapore of 9-13 December 1996, 
WT/MIN(96) ¶ 4 (1996).  
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cesses. Instead, it has historically conceived of itself as engaged 
in the management of a single-value regime, charged only with 
promoting the goal of multilaterally negotiated deregulated in-
ternational trade. The dispute settlement body has tried, to the 
extent possible, to examine only the processes that led to a do-
mestic political decision and its effects on trade, and to ignore 
questions of the legitimacy of the values themselves. In the 
China—Audiovisuals case, for example, the panel did not exam-
ine the legitimacy of the values protected by China’s censorship 
policy, but merely the means through which it was enforced.
203
 
As the Panel noted in US—Gambling, “the content of these con-
cepts for Members can vary in time and space, depending upon 
a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical 
and religious values.”204 
As non-trade values continue to intrude on international 
trade regime, however, it has become increasingly untenable for 
the WTO to present itself as standing in isolation from difficult 
political choices. Since the birth of the Appellate Body, with its 
more generalist judges, these issues have begun to be confront-
ed more directly. In US—Gasoline, for example, the Appellate 
Body noted that “the General Agreement is not to be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law.”205 And the Ap-
pellate Body has on multiple occasions made reference to other 
international agreements in its decisions. The Doha round has 
made some additional steps in this direction. The declaration on 
TRIPs and access to medicines, for example, was a major con-
                                                 
203 Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Ser-
vices for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc 
WT/DS363/AB/R, AB-2009-3 (21 December 2009); See also Joost Pauwelyn, Note, Squaring 
Free Trade in Culture with Chinese Censorship: the WTO Appellate Body Report on China—
Audiovisuals, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 14–15 (2009). 
204 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004), ¶ 6.461 quoted in M.J. 
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 628 (2002). 
205 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996), III. Article 81 ¶ 2. See also Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n, 58th sess, Report of the ILC Study Group, Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi-
culties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,1 May-9 June and 3 
July-11 August 2006, U. N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 Apr. 2006). 
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cession to the notion that ‘neutral’ trade rules can have serious 
impacts on ‘non-trade’ concerns. And the assessment of envi-
ronmental issues has also been an official—and difficult—part 
of the Doha negotiations. Nevertheless, the WTO continues to 
be shy of integrating non-trade concerns into the international 
trading framework, and it is structurally difficult for it to 
achieve such integration other than by extending derogations.  
B. The EU 
With respect to the integration of trade and non-trade 
concerns, the EU has taken a fundamentally different approach. 
The integration of different policy fields is expressly supported, 
even required, by a number of different Treaty articles.
206
 From 
environment to sex equality, the EU has made a conscious 
choice to conceive of non-trade issues as (also) part of market 
policy—that is to say the internal market is a market of values, 
and a market of other policies. Europe is built around its market, 
and the integration of the markets of its Member States has been 
the earliest and primary goal of the EU. With the market as its 
main instrument, but with wider aspirations, it is not surprising 
that the integration of trade and non-trade concerns naturally 
flows from the way the EU is structured. 
Both the European Treaties and the case law of the ECJ 
show that in addition to liberalizing trade and removing obsta-
cles to trade, the European legislator is permitted to and should 
take into account non-trade concerns. Article 114 TFEU permits 
legislators to adopt measures with the aim of establishing or en-
suring the functioning of the European market.
207
 Article 114 
does not give the EU a general competence to legislate. Instead, 
the ECJ has determined that it can only be relied on if the 
measures adopted genuinely improve the conditions for the es-
tablishment and functioning of the internal market. But the 
                                                 
206 TFEU, supra note 3, art. 7–13. 
207 Id. art. 114. 
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meaning of ‘genuine improvement’ is broad, and includes both 
trade and non-trade measures.  
Indeed, EU legislators can and do take into account a 
number of non-trade concerns. The TFEU explicitly requires the 
EU to protect a number of non-trade interests, including envi-
ronmental protection,
208
 social protection,
209
 consumer protec-
tion,
210
 animal welfare,
211
 and human health.
212
 Moreover, Arti-
cle 114 permits European regulation even where non-trade 
concerns are the decisive factor in the EU’s decision to regu-
late.
213
 And once an act based on Article 114 TFEU has already 
removed any obstacle to trade in the area that it harmonizes, the 
Community legislature may also adapt that act to any change in 
circumstances or development of knowledge respecting its task 
of safeguarding the general interests recognized by the Trea-
ty.
214
 
Unlike the WTO, therefore, the EU has never been fo-
cused solely on the single goal of promoting free trade. The 
Court has emphasized the integration of different policy objec-
                                                 
208 Id. art. 11 (“Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular, with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.”). 
209 Id. art. 9 (“In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into 
account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education [and] 
training...”). 
210 Id. art. 12 (“Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and 
implementing other Union policies and activities.”). 
211Id. art. 13 (“In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the Union and the 
Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare require-
ments of animals, while respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of 
the Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional herit-
age.”). 
212 TFEU, supra note 3, art. 9 (“In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Un-
ion shall take into account requirements linked to the… protection of human health.”). 
213 Case C-58/08, The Queen on the application of Vodafone Ltd v. Secretary of State, 2010 
E.C.R. I-04999, ¶ 36 (“provided that the conditions for recourse to Article 95 EC [TFEU Art. 
114] as a legal basis are fulfilled, the Community legislature cannot be prevented from relying 
on a legal basis on the ground that consumer protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be 
made.”). 
214 Id. ¶ 34. 
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tives in the EU policy. In Outokumpu Oy for example, the Court 
noted that “compatibility with the environment, particularly of 
methods of producing electrical energy, is an important objec-
tive of the [EU]'s energy policy.”215 And in EU-Wood-Trading 
the ECJ interpreted the Regulation as falling “within the frame-
work of the environmental policy pursued by the Community,” 
rather than “as seeking to implement the free movement of 
waste within the Community.”216  
In Preussen Elektra, the case requiring German electrici-
ty suppliers to purchase energy from renewable sources, the 
Court also emphasized the integration of environmental policy 
into other EU policies.
217
 As noted above, the Court ruled that 
although the German law restricted intra-EU trade, it was justi-
fied because the measure was “useful” for protecting the envi-
ronment “in so far as it contributes to the reduction in emissions 
of greenhouse gases which are amongst the main causes of cli-
mate change which the European Community and its Member 
States have pledged to combat.”218 The Court referred to a 
number of EU measures and international treaties such as the 
UNNCCCC and the Kyoto protocol to support this argument.
219
 
It also noted that European climate change policy is “designed 
to protect the health and life of humans, animals and plants,”220 
and specifically referred to TFEU Article 11, which requires 
European policies to take environmental protection into ac-
count.
221
 The Court emphasized that in the absence of harmoni-
zation, Member States are permitted to restrict trade on the basis 
of non-trade concerns, especially where those non-trade con-
cerns are part of EU policy.  
                                                 
215 Id. ¶ 33. 
216Case C-277/02, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Management-Gesellschaft 
Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-11987. ¶. 34. 
217 Id. ¶ 76. 
218 C-376/98, Preussen Elektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-2099, ¶ 73; See also Goos-
sens & Emmerechts, supra note 173. 
219 Goossens & Emmerechts, supra note 173. 
220 Preussen Elektra, 2001 E.C.R. I-2099 , ¶ 75. 
221 Id. ¶ 76. 
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Focusing on EU PPM policy and legislation, there are 
several examples of integration of trade and other policies.
222
 
The Integrated Product Policy of the EU seeks to minimize en-
vironmental harm by targeting environmental harm at all phases 
of a product’s life cycle where it is most effective. The phases 
of a product’s life cycle “cover… all the areas from the extrac-
tion of natural resources, through their design, manufacture, as-
sembly, marketing, distribution, sale and use to their eventual 
disposal as waste.”223 At the same time it also involves many 
different actors such as designers, industry, marketing people, 
retailers and consumers. IPP attempts to stimulate each part of 
these individual phases to improve their environmental perfor-
mance.”224 The Commission has emphasized in its Communica-
tion on the Integrated Product Policy that “full account will be 
taken of the [EU]’s obligations under international law, in par-
ticular as regards trade, as well as the principles governing other 
[EU] policies.”225 In an earlier Communication on Trade and 
Environment the Commission noted that the product/process 
distinction is becoming increasingly diffuse, because, among 
other reasons, new instruments of environmental policy are 
based on the so-called “life-cycle approach.”226  
In legislation there have been several EU PPM measures 
which address non-trade concerns such as animal welfare and 
climate change. The oldest one is Council Regulation 3254/91 
of 4 November 1991 prohibiting the use of leghold traps in the 
EU and the introduction into the EU of pelts and manufactured 
goods of certain wild animal species originating in countries 
                                                 
222 See, e.g., European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Social Committee and the Commmittee of the Regions, Towards a Single Mar-
ket Act: For a highly competitive social market economy, COM (2010) 608 final/2 (2010). 
223 EUROPEAN COMMISSION: ENVIRONMENT, WHAT IS INTEGRATED PRODUCT POLICY, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ipp/integratedpp.htm.  
224 Id. See also Case C-277/02, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v. Sonderabfall-Management-
Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-11987 ¶ 35 (noting the necessity of life cycle 
management of environmental harms such as the disposal of waste).  
225 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament at p. 6, 
COM (2003) 302 final (June 6, 2003). 
226 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: On 
Trade and Environment at p. 13, COM (1996) 302 final (Feb. 28, 1996). 
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which catch them by means of leghold traps or trapping meth-
ods which do not meet international humane trapping stand-
ards.
227
 The legal basis for this regulation was TFEU article 207 
(Common Commercial Policy) and TFEU article 192 (Envi-
ronmental Policy). This measure almost led some other WTO 
Members to challenge it, but eventually an understanding was 
reached.
228
 
Another animal welfare EU PPM measure is the more 
recent regulation on the marketing of seal products discussed 
above.
229
 The preamble of the Regulation declares that: “In ac-
cordance with the Protocol on protection and welfare of animals 
annexed to the Treaty, the [EU] is to pay full regard to the wel-
fare requirements of animals when formulating and implement-
ing, inter alia, its internal market policy. The harmonised (sic) 
rules provided for in this Regulation should accordingly take 
fully into account considerations of the welfare of animals.”230 
Similarly, Directive 2003/15/EC on the approximation of the 
laws of Member States relating to cosmetic products prohibits 
the marketing of cosmetic products that have been subject to 
certain methods of animal testing.
231
 
With respect to combating climate change, Directive 
2009/29/EC, which aims to improve and extend the greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading scheme of the EU, notes the 
                                                 
227 Council Regulation 3254/91, 1991 O.J. (L 308) 1. 
228 Van Calster, supra note 65, at 14. 
229 Regulation 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36. 
230 Id. at 9. It is worth noting that several Inuit groups have challenged the regulation before the 
General Court on the basis of lack of competence, see e.g., Action brought on 11 January 2010 – 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami e.a. v Parliament and Council, 2010 O.J. (C 100/41, Case T-18/10) (ar-
guing “the contested regulation does not result in such improvement as required by the Europe-
an Courts' case law but, on the contrary, it will effectively eliminate any possibility of an inter-
nal market in seal products covered by the regulation's scope,” and that “the defendants erred in 
law by infringing the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality… [and] do not demonstrate 
why intervention at the European Union level is required. The applicants point out that only two 
Member States had already introduced a ban on seal products. Furthermore, they argue that, 
even if action at European Union level was to meet the subsidiarity requirement, less intrusive 
measures would have sufficed to meet the stated goals of the regulation. The applicants contest 
the fact that the defendants opted for a near total ban on seal products, rather than adopting less 
restrictive alternatives, such as labeling requirements.”) 
231 Directive 2003/15/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 66) 26. 
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problem of carbon leakage and mandates action if producers are 
exposed to carbon leakage or loss of market share due to im-
posed emission burdens.
232
 Also, the EU has recently adopted a 
regulation laying down the obligations of operators who place 
timber and timber products on the EU market.
233
 This regulation 
only permits trade in timber products if these products have 
been harvested legally, according to national, that is to say the 
standards in the harvesting country, and international standards 
accepted by the harvesting country. In addition, Member States 
are permitted, for environmental purposes, to impose more 
stringent requirements on operators on their markets.
234
 Also, as 
mentioned above, the EU has long attached human rights and 
other conditions to trade agreements.
235
  
At the WTO, too, the EU has favored the incorporation 
of non-trade concerns. In EC—Asbestos, for example, the EC 
argued that determining likeness “solely on the basis of com-
mercial factors” would be “a serious curtailment of regulatory 
autonomy” because “[i]f non-commercial considerations [were] 
only considered at the Article XX stage of the analysis, then the 
list of policy purposes for which regulators may distinguish be-
tween products [would be] unduly limited to the categories 
listed in Article XX.”236 This broader approach on the determi-
nation of likeness is similar to the ECJ case law on product 
taxation, an issue we will explore below.  
It could be argued that the integration of trade and non-
trade policies is also an identity issue, both internally and exter-
nally. Internally, the EU has often struggled against European 
                                                 
232 Directive 2009/29/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63. 
233 Regulation 995/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2010 O.J. (L 295) 23, 
art. 4.  
234 The TFEU reads “[t]he protective measures adopted pursuant to Article 192 shall not prevent 
any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such 
measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They shall be notified to the Commission.” 
TFEU, supra note 3, art. 193. 
235 See supra Section III(1)(B). 
236 Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbes-
tos–Containing Products, ¶ 34, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC—Asbestos]. 
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opposition to the dominance of the market and free trade in EU 
policies, and has been anxious to emphasize that the European 
model is a model of a ‘social market’ or a ‘market with values.’ 
Often in implicit opposition to popular stereotypes of the US, or 
of the one-sidedness of international trade, the EU, following 
the policy lead of its dominant Member States, sets out to inte-
grate and balance economic and non-economic policy in one 
coherent whole, and rejects the idea of trade as an independent 
policy area. In that sense it does not adhere to the classical 
comparative advantage-based logic of trade, at least internally, 
but rather sees the merits of trade in the social and economic in-
tegration which it brings, which in turn are seen as improvers of 
welfare. Integration is a powerful imperative of its own, even if 
the belief that it improves economic wellbeing is now an im-
portant part of the integrationist drive. 
4. Product taxation and regulatory purpose 
With regard to the internal market tax provisions, the 
ECJ has interpreted the legality of product taxation by EU 
Member States very differently than the Appellate Body of the 
WTO. The Court has allowed Member States to differentiate be-
tween products on the basis of ‘objective factors’ not only relat-
ed to their position on the market place but also from other 
regulatory perspectives, such as the impact on the environment 
of the production process employed.
237
  
EU law is similar to international trade law in requiring 
like taxation of like products. One obvious locus for a PPM de-
bate is in the question whether, for example, sustainable wood is 
‘like’ or ‘similar to’ non-sustainably harvested wood and 
whether they must therefore be similarly taxed. This raises a 
number of issues that are not always answered the same way in 
                                                 
237 See Reinhard Quick & Christian Lau, Environmentally Motivated Tax Distinctions and WTO 
Law — The European Commission’s Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy in Light of 
‘Like Product–’ and ‘PPM–’ Debates, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 419, 450–51 (2003) (citation omitted) 
(“When comparing EU and WTO jurisprudence on non–discrimination, one is faced with the 
astonishing result that the ECJ seems to more easily accept legitimate policy objectives as justi-
fying trade restrictions.”).  
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EU and WTO law. One of these issues is the extent to which 
policy goals can be taken into account in making tax distinc-
tions. If physically identical products compete in a market, can 
they be distinguished for tax purposes on the grounds of unde-
sirable social or environmental consequences attaching to their 
differing production methods? Is the purpose of regulation rele-
vant to the legitimacy of its classifications? 
It is well known that the Appellate Body in Japan – Al-
coholic Beverages II rejected the ‘aims and effects’ test for de-
termining the GATT-compliance of tax measures.
238
 Japan ar-
gued that the complainants had to establish protectionist intent 
in order for the measure to violate Article III:2 first sentence.
239
 
It is widely believed that as a result of this decision regulatory 
purpose is irrelevant for the finding of unlawful discrimination 
between domestic and imported ‘like’ products.240 Despite some 
arguments to the contrary—notably by Howse and Regan241—
most commentators believe that taking regulatory purpose into 
account in the determination of likeness would render Article 
XX redundant.
242
 
The ECJ has been much less reluctant to take into ac-
count the regulatory purpose of a tax regulation when examin-
                                                 
238 Howse & Regan, supra note 59, at 264. See Appellate Body Report, Japan — Taxes on Alco-
holic Beverages, § B(3), at 6, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) 
[hereinafter Japan—Alcohol], for a discussion of the rejection of the ‘aims and effects’ test. 
239Japan—Alcohol, supra note 238, § B(1), at 3–4. 
240 Howse & Regan, supra note 59. Indeed, in Japan—Alcohol the Appellate Body explained: “It 
is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons legislators and regulators often 
have for what they do and weigh the relative significance of those reasons to establish legislative 
or regulatory intent. If the measure is applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford 
protection to domestic production, then it does not matter that there may not have been any de-
sire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators or the regulators who imposed the 
measure.” Japan—Alcohol, supra note 238, § H(2)(c), at 27–28. 
241 Howse and Regan have argued that notwithstanding the Appellate Body’s finding, protec-
tionist intent or subjective protectionist purpose might still be used as supporting evidence to 
make two products unlike for the purposes of Article II:2 first sentence and Article III:4 of the 
GATT. Their analysis would focus on the relationship between two products from the perspec-
tive of the consumer. Howse & Regan, supra note 59, at 264–268. 
242 Quick & Lau, supra note 237, at 454–456. Howse and Regan argue by contrast that Article 
XX would still have a role to play in justifying other breaches of the GATT, as well as after a 
finding of direct discrimination under Article III. Howse & Regan, supra note 59. 
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ing potential violations of the treaty provision on discriminatory 
product taxation. The ECJ employs a two-stage approach to Ar-
ticle 110 TFEU: First, it looks at whether there are objective cri-
teria for distinguishing between two products that are unrelated 
to origin. These objective criteria are set by the regulating 
Member State and may include among others the production 
processes employed in the manufacture of the product.
243
 If the 
Court accepts these criteria, Article 110 TFEU does not apply. 
If not, the Court goes into an analysis of Article 110 TFEU.
244
 
In order to comply with this article, tax distinctions must be 
based on legitimate goals and objective considerations, and be 
proportionate.
245
 
Article 110 TFEU is very similar to GATT Article III:2. It 
reads: 
No Member State shall impose, directly or indi-
rectly, on the products of other Member States 
any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that 
imposed directly or indirectly on similar domes-
tic products. 
Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on 
the products of other Member States any internal 
taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect 
protection to other products.
246
 
                                                 
243 See, e.g., Case 127/75, Bobie Getränkevertrieb GmbH v Hauptzollamt Aachen-Nord, 1976 
E.C.R. 1079.; Case 140/79, Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v. DAF SpA, 1981 E.C.R. 1; Case 
243/84, John Walker & Sons Ltd. v. Ministeriet for Skatter og Afgif, 1986 E.C.R. 00875; Case 
196/85, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 01597; 
Case C–90/94, Haahr Petroleum Ltd v. Åbenrå Havn, Ålborg Havn, Horsens Havn, Kastrup 
Havn NKE A/S, Næstved Havn, Odense Havn, Struer Havn and Vejle Havn, and Trafikminis-
teriet, 1997 E.C.R. I–04085; Case C–213/96, Outokumpu Oy, 1998 E.C.R. I–01777; Joined 
Cases C–290/05 & C–333/05, Ákos Nádasdi v. Vám– és Pénzügyőrség Észak–Alföldi Re-
gionális Parancsnoksága, and Ilona Németh v. Vám– és Pénzügyőrség Dél–Alföldi Regionális 
Parancsnoksága, 2006 E.C.R. I–10115. 
244 See CATHARINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 53–56 
(2010). 
245 Outokumpu Oy 1998 E.C.R. I–01777, ¶ 40. 
246 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 110, Sep. 
5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.  
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Once a tax measure is found to be in violation of Article 
110 TFEU it is not possible to justify the measure, as the dero-
gation article applies only to regulatory measures, and it is 
therefore incompatible with the treaty.
247
 It is thus not surprising 
that the Court takes the regulatory purpose of a tax measure into 
account in establishing whether such measure violates Article 
110 TFEU. Moreover, because the field of taxation is seen as a 
sensitive area, the Court has taken a permissive approach to-
wards tax measures. This in contrast to the Court’s interpreta-
tion of quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent ef-
fect—regarding which it has taken a much more restrictive 
approach.
248
 
Regulatory purpose is important for PPM measures be-
cause it is what often makes two physically identical products 
with similar end-uses different. It has been established case law 
of the Court that Member States are permitted to distinguish 
even similar products for regulatory purposes.  
The most striking example of a PPM measure reviewed 
by the Court under Article 110 TFEU was in Outokumpu Oy, 
where the ECJ reviewed a Finnish tax provision that differenti-
ated the rate of tax on electricity on the basis of the production 
method of electricity.
249
 Finland argued that its rule was im-
posed on environmental grounds, and that the taxes were de-
signed to encourage more ecologically sound methods of energy 
production. The Court stated:  
As regards the compatibility of such a duty with 
Article [110] of the Treaty, it is settled case-law, 
first, that in its present state of development 
Community law does not restrict the freedom of 
each Member State to establish a tax system 
                                                 
247 Case C–302/00, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, ¶ 33, 2002 
E.C.R. I–02055. This difference with the GATT, where Article XX applies as a general deroga-
tion clause, might explain the inclusion of the regulatory purpose in the assessment whether a 
measure violates Article 110 TFEU. 
248 See BARNARD, supra note 244, at 53–56. 
249 Case C–213/96, Outokumpu Oy, 1998 E.C.R. I–01777, ¶ 17. 
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which differentiates between certain products, 
even products which are similar within the mean-
ing of the first paragraph of Article [110] of the 
Treaty, on the basis of objective criteria, such as 
the nature of the raw materials used or the pro-
duction processes employed. Such differentiation 
is compatible with Community law, however, 
only if it pursues objectives which are them-
selves compatible with the requirements of the 
Treaty and its secondary legislation, and if the 
detailed rules are such as to avoid any form of 
discrimination, direct or indirect, against imports 
from other Member States or any form of protec-
tion of competing domestic products. 
Article [110] of the Treaty therefore does not 
preclude the rate of an internal tax on electricity 
from varying according to the manner in which 
the electricity is produced and the raw materials 
used for its production, in so far as that differen-
tiation is based… on environmental considera-
tions.
250
 
This was so because “protection of the environment con-
stitutes one of the essential objectives of the Community.”251 
“Moreover, since the entry into force of the Treaty on European 
Union, the Community's task includes the promotion of sustain-
able and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment 
(Article [3 TEU]) and its activities include a policy in the sphere 
of the environment (Article [4 paragraph 2 under e TFEU]).”252 
Also, “compatibility with the environment, particularly of 
methods of producing electrical energy, is an important objec-
tive of the Community's energy policy.”253  
                                                 
250 Id. ¶¶ 30–31. 
251 Id. ¶ 32. 
252 Id.. 
253 Id. ¶ 33. 
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The Court nevertheless concluded that the tax provision 
was incompatible with the treaty, because it calculated taxes on 
imported electricity at a different rate than those on domestic 
electricity.
254
  Had the environmental differentiations applied 
across the board, they would have been compatible with Article 
110.
255
 Interestingly, the Court rejected the Finnish govern-
ment’s argument that it would be very difficult to establish the 
nature of the imported electricity since, once it entered the grid, 
it was indistinguishable from other electricity.
256
 The Court held 
that practical difficulties cannot justify such discriminatory tax-
ation:  
While the characteristics of electricity may in-
deed make it extremely difficult to determine 
precisely the method of production of imported 
electricity and hence the primary energy sources 
used for that purpose, the Finnish legislation at 
issue does not even give the importer the oppor-
tunity of demonstrating that the electricity im-
ported by him has been produced by a particular 
method in order to qualify for the rate applicable 
to electricity of domestic origin produced by the 
same method.
257
 
The divergence of approaches between the WTO and 
EU can be further illustrated by comparing the Court’s ruling in 
Bobie with the GATT panel report in US—Malt Beverages.258 
                                                 
254 Case C–213/96, Outokumpu Oy, 1998 E.C.R. I–01777, ¶ 41. 
255 See id. ¶ 31. 
256 Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
257 Id. ¶ 39. This is in stark contrast with the Court’s judgment in Preussen Elektra, where the 
Court found that “the nature of electricity is such that, once it has been allowed into the trans-
mission or distribution system, it is difficult to determine its origin and in particular the source 
of energy from which it was produced,” and therefore accepted the necessity of an obligation to 
buy domestically produced green electricity. See Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. 
Schleswag AG, 2001 E.C.R. I-2099, ¶ 79. 
258 Compare Case 127/75, Bobie Getränkevertrieb GmbH v Hauptzollamt Aachen-Nord, 1976 
E.C.R. 1079, with Report of the Panel, United States — Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages, DS23/R (Mar. 16, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1993) [hereinafter 
US—Malt].  
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Both cases dealt with preferential tax arrangements for micro-
breweries.
259
 In Bobie, the Court had to rule on the question 
whether a German tax provision that applied a graduated rate at 
home-produced beer and a flat rate on ordinary imported beer 
was compatible with Article 110 TFEU.
260
 The ECJ ruled that 
Member States may apply different systems of taxation to do-
mestic and imported products so long as “the charge to the tax 
on the imported products remains at all times the same as or 
lower than the charge applicable to the similar domestic prod-
uct.”261 In principle, therefore, a Member State is free to choose 
the tax system that it considers most suitable for each product, 
even if the system distinguishes among products based on PPM 
criteria:  
[T]he application to home-produced beer of a 
graduated tax calculated on the basis of the year-
ly production of each brewery is a matter which 
falls within the discretion of each State. . . . If . . . 
a Member State has elected to apply to home-
produced beer a graduated tax calculated on the 
basis of the quantity which each brewery pro-
duces in one year, the first paragraph of Article 
[110] is only fully complied with if the foreign 
beer is also taxed at a rate, the same or lower, 
applied to the quantities of beer produced by 
each brewery during the period of one year.
262
 
The GATT Panel in US—Malt Beverages, on the other 
hand, found a similar distinction in principle incompatible with 
the GATT. In that case, the Panel had to decide, among other 
things, whether State excise tax credits based on the annual pro-
                                                 
259 Bobie, 1976 E.C.R. 1079; US—Malt, supra note 258. 
260 See Bobie, 1976 E.C.R. 1079, ¶ 6. 
261 Id. ¶ 3. 
262 Id. ¶¶ 8–10. 
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duction of beer in the State of Minnesota were a violation of 
GATT Article III:2 first sentence.
263
 The Panel held that:  
[T]he parties disagreed as to whether or not the 
tax credits in Minnesota were available in the 
case of imported beer from small foreign brewer-
ies. The Panel considered that beer produced by 
large breweries is not unlike beer produced by 
small breweries. Indeed, the United States did 
not assert that the size of the breweries affected 
the nature of the beer produced or otherwise af-
fected beer as a product. Therefore, in the view 
of the Panel, even if Minnesota were to grant the 
tax credits on a non-discriminatory basis to small 
breweries inside and outside the United States, 
imported beer from large breweries would be 
“subject . . . to internal taxes . . . in excess of 
those applied . . . to like domestic products” from 
small breweries and there would still be an in-
consistency with Article III:2, first sentence. Ac-
cordingly, the Panel found that the state excise 
tax credits provided by Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Ohio and Wisconsin to domestic breweries based 
on annual beer production, but not to imported 
beer, are inconsistent with Article III:2, first sen-
tence.
264
 
Of course, the United States could potentially have had 
recourse to Article XX of GATT to justify its measures, but the 
list contained in Article XX is limited, and strictly interpret-
ed.
265
 Because there is no derogation clause for indirect tax 
measures, it is not surprising that the ECJ will take regulatory 
purpose into account when assessing such measures. But the 
fact that such assessment is not confined to a limited list means 
                                                 
263 US—Malt, supra note 258, ¶ 3.8(c). 
264 US—Malt, supra note 258, ¶ 5.19. 
265 See Report of the Panel, United States — Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.9, (Jan. 
16, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990).  
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that there is more room for legislators to tax products in differ-
ent ways for different purposes. In this sense, too, EU law 
seems to be more willing to take non-trade concerns into ac-
count, as long as the measures in question are applied equally to 
foreign products that meet the same objective criteria.  
IV. Conclusion 
Given the above analysis, the potential for conflicts or 
divergence between WTO and EU law is easy to imagine. The 
WTO is a trade regime that is institutionally disinclined to per-
mit extraterritorial and unilateral PPMs where they upset the 
balance of trade equilibrium among Member States. And the EU 
is a multi-issue regional body that sees PPMs as an opportunity 
to strengthen EU authority internally and promote European 
values abroad. Indeed, the differing philosophies of the WTO 
and EU with respect to the proper forum and content of PPM 
rules are evidenced by the fact that the EU has been a partici-
pant in nearly every one of the WTO disputes touching on the 
PPMs issue so far.
266
  
Perhaps the potential conflicts between the EU and WTO ap-
proaches are best illustrated by an example. All of these tenden-
cies can be seen in the recent seals dispute brought against the 
EU by Norway, Canada and Iceland.
267
 As discussed above, this 
                                                 
266 In Tuna/Dolphin I, the EEC intervened as a third party, arguing that the US dolphin–
protection measure’s intermediary nations embargo was incompatible with the GATT. US—
Tuna I, supra note 5, ¶ 4.10. In Tuna/Dolphin II the EEC appeared as the primary complainant, 
arguing once more that US dolphin–protection law was contrary to the GATT. US—Tuna II, 
supra note 5, ¶ 1.1. The EC appeared again as a third party in US—Shrimp. US—Shrimp, supra 
note 5, ¶ 65. It was the defendant in EC—Asbestos and EC—Biotech. EC—Asbestos, supra note 
236, ¶ 30; Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Market-
ing of Biotech Products, ¶ 1.1, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006). 
And is currently the subject of complaints regarding poultry and seals. Request for the Estab-
lishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities — Certain Measures Affecting 
Poultry Meat and Poultry Meat Products from the United States, WT/DS389/4 (Oct. 12, 2009), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds389_e.htm; Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by Norway, European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Im-
portation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS401/5 (Mar. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ ds401_e.htm [hereinafter EC—Seal 
Products I]. 
267 EC—Seal Products I, supra note266. 
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situation began with the imposition of measures by Belgium and 
the Netherlands prohibiting the import of seals and seal prod-
ucts out of concern for animal welfare abroad. Rather than pur-
suing the annulment of these measures as unilateral and extra-
territorial, and restrictive of intra-EU trade, the EU instead 
chose to use the opportunity to assess the possibilities for com-
munity action. After commissioning scientific assessments of 
the harm posed to seals and conducting public opinion surveys 
to gauge the opinions of European citizens, the Parliament and 
Council adopted an EU–wide ban in September 2009.268  
Because the measure was harmonized and based on 
“concerns about the killing of seals and their commercialization 
. . . widely held in the EU,” the EU was willing to act unilateral-
ly to protect animal welfare.
269
 As the European Commission’s 
spokesperson for Rade, Lutz Guellner, stated:  
We believe that the claim that EU is not respect-
ing its WTO obligations is unfounded. The 
measures adopted are not protectionist, are not 
discriminatory, and respond to concerns about 
the killing of seals and their commercialization 
which are widely held in the EU, as confirmed 
by the overwhelming support for the legislation 
in the EU Member States and the European Par-
liament.
270
 
Other WTO Members, however, disagreed. In 2009 the 
representative of Norway raised objections in the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade regarding the EU ban on trade in 
certain seal products.
271
 Because the rule permits exemptions 
for hunts traditionally conducted by indigenous communities, 
                                                 
268 Regulation 1007/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Counsel of 16 September 2009 
on Trade in Seal Products, 2009 O.J. (L 286) 36. 
269 Press Release, Commission reaction to the request for consultations from Canada and Nor-
way on the EU’s legislation on seals (Nov. 3, 2009), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ index.cfm?id=479&serie=293&langId=en. 
270 Id. 
271 EC—Seal Products I, supra note 266. 
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Norway, with the support of Canada and Iceland, “questioned 
whether governmental regulations that distinguish two other-
wise like products, based on ethical concerns relating to the way 
they were produced, could fulfill the requirements of Article 2.2 
of the TBT Agreement.”272 Canada added its disapproval of the 
fact that the ban “would be unilaterally establishing criteria for 
animal welfare.”273  
A WTO Panel will now assess the validity of the claims 
on both sides and it will be interesting to see how the Panel will 
deal with these issues as the case illustrates well the potential 
conflicts between the EU and WTO over PPMs. With respect to 
unilateralism and extraterritoriality, internally, the EU saw not a 
conflict, but an opportunity to harmonize. Externally, the EU 
was willing to act to protect what it saw as important values. 
Other WTO Member States, however, saw an inappropriate ac-
tion to unilaterally impose animal welfare standards, particular-
ly because there was little ‘nexus’ between the seals and the EU.  
In general, the ECJ has taken a case-by-case approach to 
PPM measures, which at first glance looks very similar to that 
in the WTO case law. Issues of evidence and proportionality 
have been central, and the concern to balance trade against le-
gitimate non-trade concerns, while being alert for protectionism 
and regulatory overkill is inevitable and familiar.  
Yet a shared language and expression of many of the 
same concerns hide certain differences. The kinds of extraterri-
torial concern which have arisen in the EU cases are diverse—
industrial reputation, local and non-local environmental harm, 
animal welfare, biodiversity, the protection of artisanal indus-
try—and the Court has been surprisingly relaxed about accept-
ing these as legitimate. It has intermittently—though not con-
sistently—required that there be some link between the harm 
abroad and a domestic interest, but has been relatively open to 
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how this link may be found. Where the concern in question falls 
within the range of matters on the EU policy list—notably the 
environment, but human rights and even social justice would 
arguably also be there—this link does not even seem necessary. 
One may question whether the Appellate Body would be pre-
pared to go so far.  
Where taxation is concerned the difference is somewhat 
sharper. Tax distinctions based on PPMs, and on policy goals 
independent of the product itself, are apparently an accepted 
part of EU law—even between similar products. By contrast, 
the GATT requires such distinctions to be treated as deroga-
tions, and on the evidence so far they will be subjected to strict 
scrutiny, with considerable concern for their effects on competi-
tive position. 
The EU acceptance of PPM regulation acquires signifi-
cance because it is playing out on many levels at once. As well 
as the Court judgments, there are legislative initiatives from 
Brussels, Member States are increasingly looking at ways to in-
tegrate extraterritorial production concerns into their domestic 
government purchasing and taxation, and private organizations 
such as FSC and MSC are exerting an ever greater influence on 
domestic goods markets, and may become de facto regulators of 
certain product markets via their labels and certification 
schemes. At the same time, NGOs, Member State governments, 
and the EU often work together and coordinate, so that tensions 
between goals will be slowly replaced by an integrated network 
of regulatory actors: a private certification scheme becomes the 
basis of a national purchasing and taxation system, which in 
turn takes place within the framework of an EU directive coor-
dinating such national plans. 
Such integration creates considerable resistance to 
change. Yet as a matter of fact, access to European markets will 
become more tightly regulated as PPM regulation emerges, and 
as a matter of law, some of this regulation will be subject to 
WTO challenge. There is the making of a many-sided political 
and legal conflict. As well as the simple issues of compliance, 
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PPMs focus attention on the sustainability of single-issue inter-
national governance mechanisms, but also on the political dan-
gers of multi-issue export of norms. Differing visions of sover-
eignty, universality and of international society underlie 
attitudes to PPMs, and determine whether they are seen as a 
pathway to inter-state meddling, or the safeguarding of values in 
trade. The EU’s purposive, explicitly evangelical, and law-
based identity is distinctive in this context, and gives it an insti-
tutional bias towards substantive policy goals, and away from 
respect for constitutional boundaries, which more traditionally 
constituted states, and their representatives in the WTO adjudi-
catory bodies, may not welcome or entirely comprehend. PPM 
regulation will be a fruitful venue for the exposure of these dif-
ferences. 
 
 
